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I.  INTRODUCTION  
In the area of reproductive rights in the United States, one of the biggest 
developments in the last several years has been the so-called contraceptive coverage 
mandate. The mandate requires employers, group health plans, and health insurance 
issuers to cover all United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA)-approved 
contraceptive methods, sterilization procedures, and patient education and 
counseling.1 The Obama Administration chose to mandate this coverage in rules it 
promulgated, specifying the preventive health services for women that must be 
covered under the Affordable Care Act (ACA).2 
                                                          
 1 See infra Part II. 
 2 On March 23, 2010, President Barack Obama signed the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (PPACA). Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). Then, on March 30, 2010, he signed the Health Care and Education 
Reconciliation Act (HCERA). Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 
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Since its promulgation, hundreds of citizens, businesses, and nonprofit and 
religious organizations have challenged the mandate in dozens of lawsuits, which are 
at various stages of litigation.3 The Supreme Court of the United States ruled on two 
cases that were brought by family-owned businesses that objected to four of the 
twenty FDA-approved contraceptives.4 Both Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. (Hobby 
Lobby) and Conestoga Wood Specialties Corporation (Conestoga Wood) objected to 
two drugs, commonly known as “Plan B” and “Ella,” as well as to two intrauterine 
devices (IUDs) that operate after fertilization and prevent uterine implantation of 
fertilized eggs (human embryos), thus causing an abortifacient effect.5 Although 
Hobby Lobby and Conestoga Wood objected to paying for these four methods of 
contraception, they otherwise provided health insurance to their employees, 
including methods of contraception that they do not oppose on religious grounds.6  
This Article studies the contraceptive coverage mandate from three different 
perspectives. First, it provides a historical treatment of the regulatory rules adopted 
by agencies in the Obama Administration – specifically, the Departments of the 
Treasury, Labor, and Health and Human Services, which this Article collectively 
refers to as “the Administration” or “the Departments” – that imposed the mandate, 
focusing specifically on the rulemaking processes used to develop and promulgate 
the rules. In performing this historical study, the Article traces the development of 
the mandate from its root in the ACA to full implementation in legislative 
(substantive) rules finalized by the Administration in the summer of 2013.7 Second, 
                                                          
111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010). This Article will refer to these laws collectively as either the 
“Affordable Care Act” or the “ACA.” For a discussion of the relevant provisions of the ACA, 
the mandate, and the regulatory rules developed by the Administration that implement the 
mandate, see infra Part II. 
 3 See THE BECKET FUND FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, http://www.becketfund.org/hhs 
informationcentral (last visited Nov. 8, 2014) (accessible and comprehensive collection of 
cases and litigation documents); see also NATIONAL WOMEN’S LAW CENTER, http://www. 
nwlc.org/status-lawsuits-challenging-affordable-care-acts-birth-control-coverage-benefit (last 
visited Nov. 8, 2014) (survey of lawsuits and summaries of the status of pending cases). 
 4 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). In Hobby Lobby Stores, 
the Court affirmed the Tenth Circuit’s ruling in Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 
F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013), and reversed and remanded the ruling of the Third Circuit in 
Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Burwell, 724 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 2013).  See also Burwell 
v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-
files/cases/sebelius-v-hobby-lobby-stores-inc (last visited Nov. 8, 2014) (materials and 
commentary relating to the Hobby Lobby Stores case); see also Conestoga Wood Specialties 
Corp. v. Burwell, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/conestoga-
wood-specialties-corp-v-sebelius (last visited Nov. 8, 2014) (materials and commentary 
relating to the Conestoga Wood Specialties case). 
 5 Brief for Respondents at *4, sub nom Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 2014 WL 
546899 (No. 13-354); Brief for Petitioners at *4, sub nom Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. 
v. Sebelius, 2014 WL 173487 (No. 13-356). 
 6 See Brief for Petitioners at *5, Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, 2014 WL 
173487 (No. 13-356); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *1, Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. 
v. Sebelius, 2013 WL 5291412 (No. 13-356); see also Hobby Lobby Media Information and 
Fact Sheet, THE BECKET FUND FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, http://www.becketfund.org/hobby 
lobbyfactsheet (last visited Nov. 8, 2014). 
 7 See infra Part II. 
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this Article evaluates the mandate under the legal framework established by 
Congress in the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA),8 focusing especially on 
the Administration’s RFRA analysis in its rulemaking materials and the Supreme 
Court’s recent ruling regarding the mandate.9 Third, it analyzes the mandate under a 
moral and policy-based framework proposed by a team of leading bioethicists, 
public health policy analysts, and scholars. It applies the team’s proposed framework 
to determine whether the Departments that developed and adopted the mandate 
satisfied the various moral and policy considerations that these experts have 
highlighted.10 
The analyses in this Article will establish the following four points:  
(1) The Administration chose to employ regulatory procedures that failed to 
ensure transparency, hindered meaningful public participation, hampered 
dialogue between policymakers and interested individuals and 
organizations, and deprived the public of the deliberative process agency 
rulemaking is supposed to afford.  
(2) In its rulemaking, the Administration’s consideration of the First 
Amendment and RFRA was cursory and untimely. Consequently, the 
Administration failed adequately to consider the religious freedom 
implications of creating by regulatory rule a positive right to coverage that 
conflicted with a negative right grounded in the First Amendment that 
Congress had reinforced in RFRA. 
(3) In developing the mandate, the Administration failed adequately to address 
basic moral and policy considerations that provide concrete guidance for 
evaluating and justifying public health initiatives. Consequently, the 
Administration’s deliberations about and justifications for this public health 
initiative were unsatisfactory, failing adequately to resolve conflicts that the 
initiative created among general moral considerations. 
(4) In adopting the regulatory rules and imposing the mandate, the 
Administration “legislated” its conception of morality. The mandate does 
not simply represent the policy judgments of the policymakers, but also the 
moral judgments of the policymakers based upon their progressive moral 
vision and values.11 Thus, although the mandate is framed in regulatory, 
                                                          
 8 Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 13-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993). 
 9 See infra Part III. 
 10 See infra Part IV. 
 11 The aim of this Article is not to explicate progressive morality, nor to explore its 
ideological foundations, nor to trace its contours. Rather, it is to analyze the mandate from 
three perspectives. In the process, however, this Article will reveal that moral decision-making 
undergirds the mandate. The term “progressive” here refers to a set of ideological, moral, and 
political beliefs and values shared by proponents of a current movement as well as proponents 
of an earlier movement in United States history. The earlier movement, which historians 
identify with the Progressive Era of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, altered the 
American landscape in fundamental ways, and its effects were felt in all sectors of society and 
culture—business, education, government, law, religion, and science. See generally LEWIS L. 
GOULD, AMERICA IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA, 1890–1914 (2001); THE PROGRESSIVE ERA (Lewis 
L. Gould, ed., 1974); WALTER NUGENT, PROGRESSIVISM: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 
(2010); Daniel T. Rogers, In Search of Progressivism, 10 REV. AM. HIST. 113 (1982). In 
government and law, the Progressives manifested great confidence that “unbiased” physical 
and social sciences and technical expertise, reason and decisions based upon empirical data, 
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public health, social scientific, and medical terminology, it advances a 
particular moral vision, is premised upon the moral values held by the 
policymakers, and reflects their conception of what is “good” and what 
constitutes a “good society.”12 
                                                          
and government, its administrative apparatus, and “administratively organized ‘communities’ 
of highly trained, objective professionals” would lead society forward and bring about 
transformative social, legal, and economic reforms. Joel D. Schwartz, Book Review, Liberty, 
Democracy, and the Origins of American Bureaucracy, 97 HARV. L. REV. 815, 820 (1984). 
For the Progressives, science, expertise, and administration held the promise of the future, and 
the interests of businesses and business owners and the concerns of lay people were 
understood as obstacles to the desired progress. See generally RICHARD L. MCCORMICK, THE 
PARTY PERIOD AND PUBLIC POLICY: AMERICAN POLITICS FROM THE AGE OF JACKSON TO THE 
PROGRESSIVE ERA (1988); WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE ROOTS OF AMERICAN BUREAUCRACY 
1830-1900 (1982); MARTIN SHAPIRO, WHO GUARDS THE GUARDIANS?: JUDICIAL CONTROL OF 
ADMINISTRATION (1988); DWIGHT WALDO, THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE: A STUDY OF THE 
POLITICAL THEORY OF AMERICAN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION (1984); ROBERT H. WIEBE, THE 
SEARCH FOR ORDER 1877-1920 (1967); Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in 
American Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1276 (1984); Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in 
Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189 (1986). As for the current manifestation of 
progressivism, scholars on both the left and the right have begun to identify a progressive 
movement currently underway. See Charles Murray, The Trouble Isn’t Liberals. It’s 
Progressives. WALL STREET J. (July 1, 2014) (“[P]rogressive intellectuals [a century ago] were 
passionate advocates of rule by disinterested experts led by a strong unifying leader. They 
were in favor of using the state to mold social institutions in the interests of the collective. 
They thought that individualism and the Constitution were both outmoded. . . . It is that core 
philosophy extolling the urge to mold society that still animates progressives today—a 
mindset that produces the shutdown of debate and growing intolerance that we are witnessing 
in today’s America. Such thinking on the left also is behind the rationales for indulging 
President Obama in his anti-constitutional use of executive power. . . . [W]e should start using 
‘liberal’ to designate the good guys on the left, reserving ‘progressive’ for those who are 
enthusiastic about an unrestrained regulatory state, who think it’s just fine to subordinate the 
interests of individuals to large social projects, who cheer the president’s abuse of executive 
power and who have no problem rationalizing the stifling of dissent.”); Jeffrey D. Sachs, The 
New Progressive Movement, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2011) (“Following our recent financial 
calamity, a third progressive era is likely to be in the making. This one should aim for three 
things. The first is a revival of crucial public services, especially education, training, public 
investment and environmental protection. The second is the end of a climate of impunity that 
encouraged nearly every Wall Street firm to commit financial fraud. The third is to re-
establish the supremacy of people votes over dollar votes in Washington. . . . The new 
movement also needs to build a public policy platform. The American people have it 
absolutely right on the three main points of a new agenda. To put it simply: tax the rich, end 
the wars and restore honest and effective government for all.”)     
 12 From its inception, the recent health care reform effort in the United States that 
culminated in the enactment of the ACA has seemingly been inspired by a particular moral 
vision. In a letter to President Obama written nearly ten months before the President signed 
the ACA into law, the late Senator Edward Kennedy highlighted their shared commitment to 
health care reform. See Letter from Senator Edward M. Kennedy to President, Barack Obama 
(May 12, 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Text-of-letter-to-the-President-
from-Senator-Edward-M-Kennedy. Senator Kennedy observed that health care “concerns 
more than material things; . . . what we face is above all a moral issue; . . . at stake are not just 
the details of policy, but fundamental principles of social justice and the character of our 
country.” Id. 
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II.  STATUTORY AND REGULATORY BACKGROUND REGARDING THE CONTRACEPTIVE 
COVERAGE MANDATE  
A.  The Relevant Affordable Care Act Provisions 
The ACA did not mandate that employers and health insurance plans cover 
contraceptives, sterilization, or patient education and services. Rather, the ACA 
required group health plans and health insurance issuers offering group or individual 
health insurance coverage to cover several broad categories of preventive health 
services.13 The following were among the required preventive health services: 
(1) Evidence-based items or services recommended with a rating of A or B by 
the United States Preventive Services Task Force (USPSTF);14 and 
(2) As to women, preventive care and screenings (in addition to those items and 
services recommended by the USPSTF) provided for in comprehensive 
guidelines supported by the U.S. Health Resources and Services 
Administration (HRSA).15 
                                                          
 13 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1001, 124 Stat. 131 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13 (2012)). 
 14 Id. See About the USPSTF, U.S. PREVENTIVE SERVICES TASK FORCE, 
http://www.uspreventiveservicestaskforce.org/Page/Name/about-the-uspstf (last visited Nov. 
9, 2014). The USPSTF is an independent, volunteer panel of primary care providers with 
expertise in prevention and evidence-based medicine. Id. The task force conducts scientific 
evidence reviews of clinical preventive services (such as screenings, counseling, and 
preventive medications) and makes recommendations for primary care clinicians and health 
systems. Janelle Guirguis-Blake, et al., Current Processes of the U.S. Preventive Service Task 
Force: Refining Evidence-Based Recommendation Development, 147 ANNALS OF INTERNAL 
MEDICINE 117, 117 (2007), available at http://www.uspreventiveservicestaskforce.org/ 
Home/GetFile/6/7/currprocess/pdf. The Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) 
within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) provides the task force 
administrative, research, technical, and dissemination support. See id. The Director of AHRQ 
appoints new USPSTF members, with guidance provided by the Chair of the task force. U.S. 
Preventive Services Task Force (USPSTF): An Introduction, AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE 
RESEARCH AND QUALITY, http://www.ahrq.gov/professionals/clinicians-providers/guidelines-
recommendations/uspstf/index.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2014). 
 15 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1001, 124 Stat. 131 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13 (2012)). HRSA is an agency within HHS that seeks to 
improve access to health care services. See About HRSA, HEALTH RES. & SERVS. ADMIN., 
http://www.hrsa.gov/about/index.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2014). This particular provision 
(the Women’s Health Amendment) was added to the bill that became the ACA in the Senate. 
Proponents of this provision thought that this additional coverage mandate for women would 
fill a gap in the initially proposed version of the preventive health services coverage mandate. 
Press Release, Sen. Barbara A. Mikulski, Mikulski Puts Women First in Health Care Reform 
Debate: Senator Introduces First Amendment to Senate Health Care Reform Bill to Guarantee 
Women Access to Preventive Screenings and Care at No Cost (Nov. 30, 2009), http://www 
.mikulski.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/mikulski-puts-women-first-in-health-care-
reform-debate. See also 155 Cong. Rec. 28841, 29070 (2009) (statements of Senators Boxer 
and Mikulski).  
68 JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH [Vol. 28:62 
 
The ACA prohibited the imposition of cost-sharing requirements (e.g, 
copayments, coinsurance, and deductibles) as to these covered items and services.16 
As the grandfathered status of health plans is lost over time, most health plans and 
health insurance issuers (and employers) will be required to cover the specified 
preventive services free of charge to beneficiaries and employees.17 
B.  The Regulations 
Subsequently, the Obama Administration adopted regulatory rules implementing 
these provisions of the ACA. It was in these rulemakings that the Administration 
decided to include all FDA-approved contraceptive methods, sterilization 
procedures, and patient education and counseling within the required package of 
covered preventive health services.  
1.  The July 2010 Interim Final Rulemaking 
In July 2010, about four months after the ACA was enacted,18 the Administration 
issued a set of interim final rules.19 These interim final rules, consistent with the 
ACA, required health plans and health insurance issuers to provide coverage of the 
following relevant categories of items and services: 
(1) Evidence-based items and services recommended by the USPSTF with a 
rating of A or B; and 
(2) For women, evidence-informed preventive care and screening provided for 
in comprehensive guidelines supported by the HRSA.20 
                                                          
 16 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1001, 124 Stat. 
131 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13 (2012)). The ACA elsewhere specifies that the 
term “cost-sharing” includes: “deductibles, coinsurance, copayments, or similar charges,” and 
“any other expenditure required of an insured individual which is a qualified medical expense 
. . . with respect to essential health benefits covered by the plan.” Id. at § 1302(c)(3)(A) 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18022(c)(3)(A)). 
 17 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1251, 124 Stat. 
119 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18011). The Departments’ regulatory materials indicate 
that the grandfathered status under the ACA “is only transitional in effect, and [that] it is 
expected that a majority of plans will lose their grandfathered status by the end of 2013.” See 
also Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 
39,870, 39,887 n.49 (July 2, 2013) [hereinafter July 2013 Final Rules].  
 18 President Obama signed the ACA on March 23 and the HCERA on March 30 of 2010. 
See supra note 2. 
 19 See Interim Final Rules for Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to 
Coverage of Preventive Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 75 
Fed. Reg. 41,726, 41,728 (July 19, 2010) [hereinafter Interim Final Rules]. In the regulatory 
materials, the Departments indicated that they were issuing other interim final rules to 
implement various provisions of the ACA, including: the provision requiring dependent 
coverage of children to age 26; the provision relating to status as a grandfathered health plan; 
and the provisions prohibiting preexisting condition exclusions, regarding lifetime and annual 
dollar limits on benefits, regarding restrictions on rescissions, and regarding patient 
protections. Id. 
 20 Id. at 41,756–59. 
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The regulatory materials indicated that the Department of Health and Human 
Services (HHS) was developing comprehensive guidelines for preventive care and 
screening for women and expected to issue them no later than August 1, 2011.21 
These interim final rules were effective on September 17, 2010, the same date 
comments from the public and interested persons were due.22 The Departments’ 
decision to issue interim final rules, instead of following the standard notice-and-
comment process that would have ensured meaningful public participation and full 
vetting of the rules before they went into effect,23 meant that the rules would be 
effective without comments from the public on any proposed rules being reviewed 
and considered by the Departments prior to the effective date.24 The Administration 
justified its decision to sidestep standard rulemaking procedures and instead to use 
the truncated rulemaking process on the following two grounds: 
(1) Statutory grounds in the Internal Revenue Code, the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act, and the Public Health Service Act;25 and 
(2) Good cause because “a full public notice and comment process” was 
impracticable and contrary to the public interest.26 
The Departments’ position was thus that they had statutory authority to employ 
the interim final rulemaking process and that the good cause exception to notice-and-
comment rulemaking applied. Citing provisions of the ACA, the Departments 
asserted that this expedited rulemaking process was necessary to ensure that the 
regulations would be in place for plan years and policy years beginning on or after 
September 23, 2010, and that coverage would be implemented on a timely basis.27 
Accordingly, the Departments determined to push the rules through, even though it 
meant that public participation would be restricted and that their consideration of the 
feedback received from the public regarding the rules would be delayed by nearly a 
year.  
                                                          
 21 Id. at 41,728. 
 22 Id. at 41,726. 
 23 Under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), agencies ordinarily adopt regulations 
pursuant to standard rulemaking procedures that require agencies (1) to give the public and 
interested persons notice of proposed rules, (2) to afford the public opportunity to comment on 
(i.e., participate in the rulemaking and give feedback regarding) proposals, and (3) to review 
the feedback received, modify proposals based upon the feedback, state in writing the reasons 
for adopting the final version of the rules, and issue the final rules. Upon issuing final rules, 
agencies specify the effective date. See 5 U.S.C. § 553. The APA provides some exceptions to 
these procedural requirements, including the good cause exemption when notice and the 
public procedure are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest. 5 U.S.C. § 
553(a), (b)(A), & (b)(B).  
 24 See Michael Asimow, Interim-Final Rules: Making Haste Slowly, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 
703, 704 (1999) (“Interim-final rules are rules adopted by federal agencies that become 
effective without prior notice and public comment and that invite post-effective public 
comment . . . . [The interim-final] rule is effective immediately but it also serves as a notice of 
proposed rulemaking for the final rule that will supplant it.”). 
 25 See Interim Final Rules, supra note 19, at 41,729–30 (listing as relevant federal statutes 
26 U.S.C. § 9833 (2012), 29 U.S.C. § 1191c (2012), 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-92 (2012)).  
 26 See Interim Final Rules, supra note 19, at 41,730 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2012)).  
 27 Id. 
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It quickly became apparent that aspects of the HRSA guidelines being developed 
by HHS would be controversial. Upon the Departments’ issuance of the interim final 
rules and public announcement regarding the development of the guidelines, the 
Planned Parenthood Federation of America launched its campaign to ensure that the 
guidelines would require coverage of family planning and all FDA-approved 
contraceptives with no cost-sharing.28 Two months later, the United States 
Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB) urged the Administration not to include 
coverage of contraception and sterilization in the list of preventive services that 
group and individual health plans must cover.29 
2.  The Institute of Medicine Committee Recommendations 
Although the interim final rules did not mandate coverage of contraceptive and 
sterilization services, the rulemaking paved the way by requiring health plans and 
health insurance issuers to cover evidence-informed preventive care and screenings 
provided for in comprehensive guidelines supported by HRSA. The Departments 
indicated that the guidelines were in development and expected by August 1, 2011.30 
The HHS Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation provided 
funds for the Institute of Medicine (IOM) to convene a committee to conduct a 
                                                          
 28 See Press Release, Planned Parenthood Fed’n of America, Planned Parenthood Supports 
Initial White House Regulations on Preventive Care; Highlights Need for New Guidelines on 
Women’s Preventive Health to Include Family Planning (July 14, 2010), http://www.planned 
parenthood.org/about-us/newsroom/press-releases/planned-parenthood-supports-initial-white-
house-regulations-preventive-care-highlights-need-new. When the interim final rules were 
issued, Planned Parenthood was ready to go with its campaign, and it was fortunate to have 
individuals friendly to its viewpoint well-positioned within HHS. Reports have shown that 
Kathleen Sebelius, the HHS Secretary who approved the mandate, had longstanding ties to 
and received political contributions from the late George Tiller, a Kansas doctor well-known 
for performing late-term abortions. See Deanna Candler, The Advisors Behind the 
Contraceptive Mandate, LIVE ACTION BLOG (Feb. 24, 2012), http://liveaction.org/blog/the-
advisors-behind-the-contraception-mandate/; Penny Starr, Sebelius: ‘Keeping Our Children 
Safe . . . Most Fundamental Task,’ CNSNEWS.COM (May 7, 2013), http://cnsnews.com/news/ 
article/sebelius-keeping-our-children-safe-most-fundamental-task. Additionally, Washington, 
D.C. attorney and former drug lobbyist William B. Schultz, whose clients at Zuckerman 
Spaeder LLP included Barr Laboratories, the maker of Plan B, became HHS’s principal 
deputy general counsel and acting general counsel in 2011 and HHS’s general counsel in 
2013. See Timothy P. Carney, Obama Nominates Ex-drug Lobbyist as Top HHS Lawyer, 
WASHINGTON EXAMINER (Dec. 19, 2012), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/tim-carney-
obama-nominates-ex-drug-lobbyist-as-top-hhs-lawyer/article/2516459; Steven Ertelt, Obama 
Names Lobbyist for Plan B Drug as Top HHS Lawyer, FREE REPUBLIC (Dec. 20, 2012), 
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/2971046/posts; U.S. Department of Health & 
Human Services, Press Release, HHS Secretary Sebelius Announces Senate Confirmation of 
William B. Schultz, Nominee for General Counsel, Department of Health and Human Services 
(Apr. 26, 2013), http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2013pres/04/20130426a.html.    
 29 Press Release, U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, USCCB Officials Urge HHS Not to 
Require Coverage of Contraception and Sterilization (Sept. 20, 2010), 
http://usccb.org/news/2010/10-162.cfm.  
 30 See supra note 21 and accompanying text.  
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review of what preventive services are necessary for women’s health and well-being 
and what services should be considered in developing comprehensive guidelines.31  
The IOM Committee on Preventive Services for Women was formed to develop 
recommendations to fill possible gaps in recommended preventive services.32 The 
sixteen-member committee held five meetings over a six-month period and 
conducted three open sessions for presentations by invited stakeholders, women’s 
health experts, and reproductive rights advocates and to hear from members of the 
public.33 Pro-choice and reproductive-choice advocates and interest groups such 
Planned Parenthood, the Guttmacher Institute, and the National Women’s Law 
Center were well-represented among the committee members and the invited 
presenters.34  
On July 19, 2011, the Committee issued a 235-page report that included various 
recommendations.35 The Committee recommended that eight preventive health 
services for women be added to the services that health plans must cover at no cost 
to patients.36 Among them was a recommendation that the full range of “FDA-
approved contraceptive methods, sterilization procedures, and patient education and 
counseling (i.e., family planning services) for women” with reproductive capacity be 
covered.37 For this recommendation, the Committee’s express objectives were 
“preventing unintended pregnancy and promoting healthy birth spacing.”38 
One member, Anthony Lo Sasso, Ph.D., dissented from the committee report, 
expressing concern that the compressed period of time prevented the Committee 
from conducting a serious, systematic review of all evidence for preventive 
services.39 Beyond the time constraints, he noted that the Committee’s process 
“lacked transparency and was largely subject to the preferences of the Committee’s 
                                                          
 31 See COMMITTEE ON PREVENTIVE SERVICES FOR WOMEN, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, 
CLINICAL PREVENTIVE SERVICES FOR WOMEN: CLOSING THE GAPS 1–2 (2011) [hereinafter 
CLOSING THE GAPS REPORT]. 
 32 Id. at 2.  
 33 Id. at v–vi, 217–21, 223–30.  
 34 See id. at 223–30 (referencing Appendix C and biographies provided by the Committee 
regarding members Dr. Angela Diaz, Dr. Francisco Garcia, Dr. Paula A. Johnson, and Dr. 
Alina Salganicoff, which fail to note the prior advocacy and interest group affiliations and 
memberships of these individuals); see id. at 218-19 (identifying several invited presenters); 
see also Helen M. Alvaré, No Compelling Interest: The “Birth Control” Mandate and 
Religious Freedom, 58 VILL. L. REV. 379, 430 (2013) (citing Letter from Anna Franzonello, 
Staff Counsel, Ams. United for Life, to Ctrs. for Medicare and Medicaid Servs. (Sept. 29, 
2011) (on file at www.freedom2care.org/docLib/20110929_AmericansUnitedforLife 
preventiveservicescomment.pdf.).  
 35 See CLOSING THE GAPS REPORT, supra note 31, at ix–x; see also Press Release, Institute 
of Medicine of the National Academies of Science, Report at a Glance (July 19, 2011), 
http://www.iom.edu/Reports/2011/Clinical-Preventive-Services-for-Women-Closing-the-
Gaps/Press-Release.aspx. 
 36 See CLOSING THE GAPS REPORT, supra note 31, at 1, 7–12. 
 37 Id. at 10, 109–10. 
 38 Id. at 102. 
 39 See id. at 231. 
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composition,” in which “a mix of objective and subjective determinations [were] 
filtered through a lens of advocacy.”40  
3.  The HRSA August 2011 Comprehensive Guidelines 
Soon thereafter, HRSA adopted the IOM Committee’s recommendations and 
issued the Women’s Preventive Services Guidelines.41 Under the HRSA-supported 
coverage guidelines, non-grandfathered plans are generally required to cover various 
preventive services without cost sharing, including the following: “All Food and 
Drug Administration approved contraceptive methods, sterilization procedures, and 
patient education and counseling for all women with reproductive capacity.”42 
4.  The August 2011 Amended Interim Final Rulemaking 
The Departments then issued amended interim final rules.43 These rules reiterated 
the requirement that health plan coverage must include preventive care and 
screenings provided for in binding comprehensive guidelines supported by HRSA.44 
In this rulemaking, and for the first time, the Administration addressed the 
considerable volume of comments submitted by the public and interested persons 
regarding the first set of interim final rules.45 Some of the commenters raised 
concerns regarding the requirement that religious employers cover contraceptive 
services that might be objectionable on religious grounds.46  
In these rules, the Departments acknowledged the appropriateness of HRSA 
considering the effect of a coverage mandate on the religious beliefs of certain 
employers when employees in “certain religious positions participate,” and they 
expressed a willingness to “provide for a religious accommodation that respects the 
unique relationship between a house of worship and its employees in ministerial 
positions.”47 Accordingly, the Departments granted HRSA discretion to establish an 
exemption for certain religious employers as to contraceptive coverage.48 The 
                                                          
 40 Id. at 232. 
 41 Health Res. and Serv. Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., Affordable Care 
Act Expands Prevention Coverage for Women’s Health and Well-Being, HRSA.GOV, 
http://www.hrsa.gov/womensguidelines (last visited Nov. 9, 2014).  
 42 Id. See also Press Release, Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., Affordable Care Act 
Ensures Women Receive Preventive Services at No Additional Cost (Aug. 1, 2011) (on file at 
http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2011pres/08/20110801b.html). 
 43 Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of Preventive 
Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 46,621 (Aug. 3, 
2011) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54, 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590, 45 C.F.R. pt. 147) [hereinafter 
Amended Interim Final Rules]. 
 44 Id. at 46,625–26. 
 45 See id. at 46,623 (stating that the public had provided “considerable feedback regarding 
which preventive services for women” should be covered).  
 46 See id. 
 47 Id. 
 48 See id. at 46,623; id. at 46,626 (granting HRSA discretion to “establish exemptions 
from [the] guidelines with respect to [] plans established or maintained by religious 
employers” and from “coverage provided in connection with [] plans established or 
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Departments defined the term “religious employer” narrowly for purposes of the 
mandate, requiring an employer to meet the following to qualify for the exemption: 
(1) The inculcation of religious values must be the purpose of the 
organization; 
(2) The organization must primarily employ persons who share the 
religious tenets of the organization; 
(3) The organization must primarily serve persons who share the religious 
tenets of the organization; and 
(4) The organization must be a nonprofit organization as described in 
section 6033(a)(1) and section 6033(a)(3)(A)(i) or (iii) of the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986, as amended.49 
The Departments adopted this narrow definition in an effort to “reasonably 
balance” their goal of extending coverage to as many women as possible while 
respecting “the unique relationship between certain religious employers and their 
employees in certain religious positions.”50  
The Administration again chose to employ the interim final rulemaking process, 
rather than the standard notice-and-comment rulemaking process.51 Unlike the 
interim final rules issued one year earlier,52 the amended interim final rules were 
effective immediately on August 1, 2011, and comments were due sixty days later on 
September 30, 2011.53 The Departments again justified their use of the truncated 
rulemaking process by citing federal statutory authority.54 Additionally, in the 
Departments’ view, the policy behind the generally required notice-and-comment 
process was satisfied by virtue of the public having had opportunity to comment on 
the initial interim final rules, and the amendments being made in the amended 
interim final rules were based on the public comments they received.55 Furthermore, 
the Departments concluded, “an additional opportunity for public comment on the 
amended interim final rules before they were made effective was impracticable and 
contrary to the public interest.”56 Providing such an additional opportunity for public 
comment would, in the Administration’s view, delay coverage for another year 
because many plan years and policy years begin in August or September.57 Similarly, 
the Departments asserted that good cause existed for waiving the general 
requirement that final rules be made effective no sooner than thirty days after they 
                                                          
maintained by religious employers with respect to any requirement to cover” the mandated 
services); see also U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., supra note 41.  
 49 Amended Interim Final Rules, supra note 43, at 46,623. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. at 46,621. 
 52 See supra Part II.B.1. 
 53 Amended Interim Final Rules, supra note 43, at 46,621. 
 54 Id. at 46,624. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. 
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are published, and thus waived the thirty-day delay requirement, making the rules 
effective immediately.58 
5.  The February 2012 Final Rulemaking 
In February 2012, the Departments finalized their interim final rules.59 In these 
“final-final rules”60 regarding coverage of preventive services, the Departments 
made no changes to their interim final rules,61 despite the fact that the Departments 
received over 200,000 comments, and despite the lawsuits instituted challenging the 
mandate.62 The Administration’s decision to retain the narrow definition for the 
exemption for religious employers occurred after a November 2011 meeting between 
President Obama and then-Archbishop Timothy Dolan, who was serving as 
president of the USCCB.63 At this meeting, President Obama indicated that he takes 
the protection of the rights of conscience with the “utmost seriousness,” and that he 
did not want to impede the Catholic Church’s work.64 The final rules were effective 
on April 16, 2012.65 
The 200,000-plus responses were submitted by an array of individuals and 
organizations with different perspectives, and they raised a range of concerns, both 
in favor of and in opposition to the Administration’s narrow religious-employer 
exemption.66 Some commenters suggested that the religious-employer exemption 
should be rescinded in its entirety so that benefits could extend to as many women as 
possible, and others, for the same reason, maintained that the exemption and the 
                                                          
 58 Id. 
 59 See Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of 
Preventive Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 8725 
(Feb. 15, 2012) [hereinafter Final Rules].   
 60 See Asimow, supra note 24, at 705 (providing description of “final-final” and “interim-
final” rule terminology). 
 61 Final Rules, supra note 59, at 8725. 
 62 Id. at 8,726.  Belmont Abbey College in Belmont, North Carolina, and Colorado 
Christian University in Lakewood, Colorado, brought two early lawsuits challenging the 
mandate. Their lawsuits were filed in November 2011 and December 2011, respectively. The 
Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, Press Release, Belmont Abbey College Sues the Federal 
Government over New Obamacare Mandate (Nov. 10, 2011), http://www.becketfund.org/wp-
content/uploads/2011/11/Press-Release-HHS-Final11.10.11.pdf; The Becket Fund for 
Religious Liberty, Press Release, Colorado Christian University First Evangelical University 
to Fight Abortifacient Mandate (Dec. 21, 2011), http://www.becketfund.org/?p=3304 
&preview=true. For copies of the complaints filed in these cases, see Belmont Abbey College 
v. Sebelius, Case No. 1:11-cv-01989 (D.D.C. 2011), http://www.becketfund.org/wp-
content/uploads/2011/11/HHS-Complaint-Final11.10.11.pdf, and Colorado Christian 
University v. Sebelius, Case No. 11-cv-03350 (D. Colo. 2011), http://www.becketfund.org/ 
wp-content/uploads/2011/12/CCU-v-Sebelius-Complaint-final.pdf. 
 63 James Taranto, When the Archbishop Met the President, WALL ST. J., (Mar. 31, 2012), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303816504577311800821270184.   
 64 Id. For additional discussion of this meeting, see infra Part IV.C.2.c. 
 65 Final Rules, supra note 59, at 8725. 
       66  Id. at 8726. 
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definition of religious employer should not be broadened.67 The following arguments 
were among those submitted in favor of expanding the exemption and broadening 
the definition of religious-employer: requiring organizations to pay for contraceptive 
services would compel them to act contrary to their religious beliefs; federal laws 
have provided for conscience clauses and religious exemptions broader than the 
currently contemplated exemption; and the narrow scope of the exemption raises 
concerns under the First Amendment and RFRA.68 Commenters also suggested 
alternative definitions of religious employer.69 
In addition to issuing this final-final rule adopting the narrowly defined 
exemption, the Administration announced that it would afford a one-year 
enforcement safe harbor to some non-exempt, nonprofit organizations with religious 
objections.70 The Departments indicated that, during the safe-harbor period, they 
would develop and propose changes to the rules to meet two goals: (1) “providing 
contraceptive coverage without cost-sharing to individuals who want it,” and (2) 
“accommodating non-exempted, non-profit organizations’ religious objections to 
covering contraceptive services.”71 The Departments anticipated developing new 
rules that would “require issuers to offer insurance without contraception coverage to 
such an employer (or plan sponsor) and simultaneously to offer contraceptive 
coverage directly to the employer’s plan participants (and their beneficiaries) who 
desire it, with no cost-sharing.”72 
In justifying their decision to finalize the interim final rules without any change, 
the Departments listed various beneficial results expected from the mandated 
coverage including:  
(1) Greater use of preventive services yields a healthier population and reduces 
health care costs; 
(2) Women have unique health care needs (such as contraceptive services) and 
burdens; 
(3) Women who are not immediately aware of a pregnancy and who experience 
unintended pregnancy may delay receiving prenatal care and continue to 
engage in high-risk behaviors and are at risk of preterm birth and low birth 
weight; 
(4) For some women, pregnancy is contraindicated; 
(5) Contraceptive use provides preventive health benefits relating to conditions 
other than pregnancy; and 
                                                          
 67 Id. at 8726–27. 
 68 Id. at 8727; see also Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq. 
(2012). 
 69 Final Rules, supra note 59, at 8725. 
 70 Id. at 8727–28; see Taranto supra note 63 (suggesting that this safe harbor, in 
Archbishop Dolan’s view, simply gave religious institutions one year to figure out how they 
would violate their consciences). Additionally, the political effect of the one-year safe harbor 
was to release some pressure and delay some fallout from the mandate until after the 2012 
presidential election. See infra note 139. 
 71 Final Rules, supra note 59, at 8727. 
 72 Id. at 8728. 
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(6) Employers will experience cost savings by avoiding medical costs related to 
pregnancy and indirect costs related to employee absences and reduced 
productivity.73 
The Departments also identified several social concerns and goals behind their 
decision to mandate coverage of these services: 
(1) The unique health needs of women place them at a disadvantage in the 
workforce compared to male coworkers; 
(2) Access to contraception improves the social and economic status of women; 
(3) Contraceptive coverage eliminates disparities in the workforce by allowing 
women to achieve equal status as healthy and productive members of the 
job force by reducing the number of unintended pregnancies and potentially 
unhealthy pregnancies; 
(4) Cost sharing can be a significant barrier to effective contraception; and 
(5) Providing women broad access to preventive services, including 
contraceptive services, will reduce disparities.74 
   
As to the scope of the religious-employer exemption, the Departments stated that 
the exemption as adopted did not undermine the benefits of the mandated coverage 
because the narrow definition of religious employer helped to ensure that the 
employees affected would already share the employer’s beliefs.75 Additionally, in 
their view, a broader exemption would result in more employees having to pay out of 
their own pockets for contraceptives and fewer employees using contraceptive 
services, which would undermine the claimed benefits of the preventive services.76 
The Departments also expressed concern that expanding the scope of the religious-
employer exemption would subject employees to the religious views of their 
employers, limit access to contraceptives, and inhibit the use of such services.77 
The Departments concluded their discussion of the reasons supporting their final-
final rules by briefly addressing conscience and religious freedom. The Departments 
believed that their rules did not undermine conscience or conscience protections 
because the rules neither prevented employers or others from expressing their 
opposition to contraceptive use, nor compelled use of contraceptives, nor required 
health care providers to prescribe contraceptives.78 Additionally, in their view, the 
rules did not undermine conscience protections or religious exemptions recognized 
in other federal laws; rather, they asserted, such protections would “be respected” 
and “strongly enforced.”79 The Departments briefly considered the First Amendment 
and RFRA, opining that their approach in the rules was consistent with both.80  
                                                          
 73 Id. at 8727–28. 
 74 Id. at 8728.  
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. at 8729. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. For additional discussion regarding the Departments’ consideration of the First 
Amendment and RFRA, see infra Part III. 
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6.  The February and August 2012 Guidance 
HHS issued a guidance document regarding the one-year enforcement safe 
harbor for non-exempted, non-grandfathered group health plans established and 
maintained by nonprofit organizations with religious objections to contraceptive 
coverage. The guidance was first issued on February 10, 2012, and then with minor 
clarifying amendments on August 15, 2012.81 The safe harbor was available only to a 
defined set of organizations: nonprofit organizations whose plans had consistently 
not covered all or the same subset of contraceptive services for religious reasons at 
any point from the February 10, 2012 issuance of the guidance onward.82 The 
guidance document specified the criteria that employers, plans, and issuers had to 
meet to qualify for the safe harbor and, thereby, avoid for one year an enforcement 
action for failing to cover some or all of the mandated services.83 To qualify for the 
safe harbor, the organization was required to execute a certification document, and 
the plan was required to provide participants a specified notice stating that some, or 
all, contraceptive coverage would not be provided under the plan for the first plan 
year beginning on or after August 1, 2012.84  
7.  The March 2012 Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM) 
In March 2012, the Departments issued an advance notice of proposed 
rulemaking (ANPRM).85 The Departments announced an intention to amend 
regulations regarding certain preventive health services and to establish alternative 
ways of ensuring preventive health services coverage “when health coverage is 
sponsored or arranged by a religious organization that objects to the coverage of 
contraceptive services for religious reasons” but does not qualify for the religious-
employer exemption.86 The Departments provided for a ninety-day comment 
period.87  
The Departments indicated that the ANPRM was “the first step” toward 
promulgating amended final rules before the end of the temporary enforcement safe 
harbor so that any accommodation of religious objections by non-exempt, nonprofit 
religious organizations would be in place at that time.88 The ANPRM made it clear 
                                                          
 81 See Ctr. for Consumer Info. & Ins. Oversight (CCIIO), Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid 
Servs. (CMS), Guidance on the Temporary Enforcement Safe Harbor for Certain Employers, 
Group Health Plans and Group Health Insurance Issuers with Respect to the Requirement to 
Cover Contraceptive Services Without Cost Sharing Under Section 2713 of the Public Health 
Service Act, Section 715(a)(1) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, and Section 
9815(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code, CMS.GOV (Feb. 10, 2012), available at 
http://www.nacua.org/documents/HHS_HealthInsurance_Guidance.pdf. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. 
 85 See Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 16,501 
(Mar. 21, 2012) [hereinafter Advance Notice]; Student Health Insurance Coverage, 77 Fed. 
Reg. 16,453, 16,456–57 (Mar. 21, 2012). 
 86 Advance Notice, supra note 85, at 16,501. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. at 16,503. 
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that the Departments had no intention of retreating from their mandate to cover all 
“[FDA]-approved contraceptive methods, sterilization procedures, and patient 
education and counseling for all women with reproductive capacity.”89 The 
Departments used the ANPRM as a means of presenting “questions and ideas to help 
shape” discussions with interested persons and stakeholders and to provide “an early 
opportunity for any interested stakeholder to provide advice and input into the policy 
development related to the accommodation to be made.”90 Among the larger 
questions posed were: (1) Who qualifies for the accommodation?91 and (2) Who 
administers the accommodation?92 Under each of these larger questions were a host 
of sub-issues that required the Departments to gather information, as well as other 
questions related to such matters as religious health insurance issuers or third-party 
administrators.93 The Departments emphasized that they wanted to hear from “all 
points of view on how to provide women access to the important preventive services 
at issue without cost sharing while accommodating religious liberty interests.”94 
In the ANPRM, the Departments stated that, “[o]n February 10, 2012, [they 
made a] commit[ment] to working with stakeholders to develop alternative ways of 
providing contraceptive coverage without cost sharing in order to accommodate non-
exempt, non-profit religious organizations with religious objections to such 
coverage.”95 The Departments indicated that, since the February 2012 
announcement, they had met with representatives of various groups and stakeholders 
to identify issues related to the accommodation.96 These consultations, in the 
Departments’ words, “began to provide more detailed information on how health 
coverage arrangements are currently structured, how religious accommodations work 
in States with contraceptive coverage requirements, and the landscape with respect 
to religious organizations that offer health benefits today.”97 They also gave the 
following explanation for the extended comment period: 
The 90-day comment period is designed to encourage maximum input 
into the development of an accommodation for religious organizations 
with religious objections to providing contraceptive coverage while 
ensuring the availability of contraceptive coverage without cost sharing 
for plan participants and beneficiaries. The Departments seek comments 
on the ideas and questions outlined in this ANPRM as well as new 
suggestions to achieve its goals. The Departments also intend to hold 
listening sessions to ensure all voices are heard. This will not be the only 
opportunity for comment. The subsequent notice of proposed rulemaking 
                                                          
 89 Id.  
 90 Id.  
 91 Id. at 16,504–05. 
 92 Id. at 16,505–07. 
 93 Id. at 16,504–08. 
 94 Id. at 16,503. 
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. 
 97 Id.(emphasis added). 
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will also include a public comment period. The Departments aim to 
ensure that the final accommodation is fully vetted and published in 
advance of the expiration of the temporary enforcement safe harbor.98 
8.  The February 2013 Proposed Rulemaking 
In February 2013, the Departments issued proposed amendments to the rules 
regarding coverage of certain preventive services.99 Unlike the method of rulemaking 
used earlier to determine the coverage of preventive services and contraceptive 
services,100 the Departments this time used the standard notice-and-comment 
rulemaking process: They provided notice, requested comments from interested 
persons on the proposed rules, set aside sixty days for the public to participate 
meaningfully, and allowed time for the Departments to review and evaluate the 
comments before finalizing and putting the rules into effect.101  
In the regulatory materials, the Departments acknowledged receiving 
approximately 200,000 comments from a variety of stakeholders in response to the 
ANPRM.102 The commenters provided feedback regarding the religious-employer 
exemption, the proposed accommodation, and other questions and issues raised by 
the Departments.103 As to the religious-employer exemption, some commenters 
expressed concern that the exemption was too narrow, and others argued that the 
exemption should be broadened to bring it into alignment with conscience clauses 
and exemptions in other federal laws and to avoid issues under the First Amendment 
and RFRA.104 Other commenters stated that the exemption should not be broadened, 
arguing that the mandate did not infringe on rights protected by the First 
Amendment or RFRA.105 As to the accommodation, some commenters argued that it 
failed to accommodate religious objections adequately and that, even with the 
accommodation, plan sponsors would end up funding the coverage.106 Others argued 
that the Departments should expand the accommodation to encompass a larger set of 
organizations that object on moral or religious grounds, and some suggested criteria 
used in other federal laws.107 Some commenters advocated for a narrow 
                                                          
 98 Id. at 16,508. 
 99 See Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 78 Fed. 
Reg. 8456 (Feb. 6, 2013) [hereinafter Proposed Rules].   
 100 See supra Parts II.B.1, II.B.4–5. 
 101 See Proposed Rules, supra note 99, at 8457. Comments were due on or before April 8, 
2013. 
 102 Id. at 8459. 
 103 Id. at 8459–60. 
 104 Id. at 8459. 
 105 Id. 
 106 Id. Some commenters urged the Departments to rescind the mandate, provide an 
exemption to any organization that objected to contraceptive services on religious or moral 
grounds, or provide government funding for the contraceptive services. Id. 
 107 Id. at 8459–460. 
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accommodation, arguing that the Departments should not expand the 
accommodation to other types of organizations.108  
The Departments proposed amending the existing rules in two respects. First, the 
proposed rules would amend the authorization granted to HRSA to exempt group 
health plans that are established or maintained by certain religious employers with 
respect to the requirement to cover contraceptive services.109 This first modification 
would adjust the qualifying criteria for the religious-employer exemption.110 
Accordingly, the Departments proposed eliminating the first three criteria from the 
existing rules and retaining the fourth as the definition of religious employer.111 In 
the Departments’ view, this approach would avoid inquiry into the purposes and the 
religious beliefs of employers and employees and limit the scope of the exemption to 
churches, synagogues, mosques, other houses of worship, and religious orders as the 
Departments’ exemption contemplated when the final rules were issued in 2012.112 
Second, the Departments would provide accommodations to group health plans 
established or maintained by eligible organizations, including student health 
insurance coverage arranged by eligible religious institutions of higher education.113 
In proposing the accommodations, the Departments specified criteria for determining 
the eligibility of organizations and a process for organizations to self-certify their 
qualification for an accommodation.114 In order to ensure that women would receive 
contraceptive coverage without cost sharing, the Departments proposed means by 
which participants and beneficiaries would be enrolled and provided coverage by 
health insurance issuers independent of the objecting organizations.115 The 
Departments’ goal for the proposed rules was to safeguard coverage while protecting 
“eligible organizations from having to contract, arrange, pay or refer for 
contraceptive coverage to which they object on religious grounds.”116 
9.  The July 2013 Final Rulemaking 
In July 2013, the Departments issued their final rules regarding coverage of 
certain preventive services.117 These rules went into effect on August 1, 2013, and 
they applied to group health plans and health insurance issuers for plan years 
beginning on or after January 1, 2014.118 The amendments to the religious-employer 
exemption applied to plans and issuers beginning on or after August 1, 2013.119  
                                                          
 108 Id. at 8460. 
 109 Id. at 8456–457, 8460. 
 110 See id. at 8459–460. 
 111 Id. at 8461. 
 112 Id.  
 113 Id. at 8457–460.  
 114 Id. at 8462. 
 115 Id. at 8462–464. 
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 117 July 2013 Final Rules, supra note 17, at 39,870. 
 118 Id. at 39,871. 
 119 Id. at 39,874. 
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The Departments reported receiving over 400,000 comments in response to the 
proposed rules, and they indicated that they considered these comments before 
issuing the final rules.120 Some of the arguments advanced by commentators were 
that contraceptive services do not prevent disease, that some are harmful to women, 
and that they should not be considered preventive health services.121 The 
Departments responded that the HRSA guidelines “are based on recommendations of 
the independent [IOM Committee], which undertook a review of the scientific and 
medical evidence on women’s preventive services.”122 The Departments reiterated 
some of the same reasons identified in the regulatory materials accompanying their 
February 2012 final rules, but this time they added that contraceptives, by reducing 
the number of unintended pregnancies, would reduce the number of women seeking 
abortions.123 The Departments also responded to a wide range of comments 
regarding the religious-employer exemption and the accommodations.124 
In the regulatory materials accompanying these final rules, the Departments gave 
RFRA and the First Amendment more substantial consideration than in prior 
rulemakings.125 Their consideration, however, extended only to matters involving 
religious employers and certain non-exempt, nonprofit religious organizations.126 
The Departments expressed their view that the accommodations do not violate 
RFRA and that the religious-employer exemption and accommodations violate 
neither the Establishment Clause nor the Free Exercise Clause of the First 
Amendment.127 Finally, they asserted that the FDA-approved contraceptive methods, 
which include Plan B, Ella, and IUDs, are not abortifacient within the meaning of 
federal law and do not violate federal restrictions relating to abortion.128  
In these final rules, the Administration completed its rulemaking on the mandate, 
finalizing the rules on two remaining issues.129 First, the Administration modified the 
religious-employer definition for purposes of the exemption.130 Under the final rules, 
a “religious employer” is “an organization that is organized and operates as a 
nonprofit entity and is referred to in section 6033(a)(3)(A)(i) or (iii) of the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986, as amended.”131  
Second, the Administration provided accommodations for group health plans that 
are established or maintained by eligible nonprofit religious organizations and for 
                                                          
 120 Id. at 39,871. 
 121 Id. at 39,872. 
 122 Id.   
 123 Id. 
 124 Id. at 39,873–88. 
 125 Id. at 39,886–88. 
 126 Id. at 39,886–88.  
 127 Id. at 39,888. 
 128 Id. 
 129 Id. at 39,870, 73. 
 130 Id. at 39,873–74. 
 131 Id. at 39,886. 
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student health insurance coverage arranged by eligible organizations that are 
institutions of higher education.132 Under the final rules, an organization has to meet 
the following criteria to be eligible for an accommodation: 
(1) It has to oppose providing coverage for some or all of the mandated 
contraceptive services on account of religious objections;  
(2) It has to be organized and operate as a nonprofit entity; 
(3) It has to hold itself out as a religious organization; and 
(4) It has to self-certify (on a specified form) that it satisfies the first three 
requirements.133 
The rules also impose specific requirements on insurance issuers that have 
received a self-certification from an eligible organization.134 They must expressly 
exclude contraceptive coverage from the group plan coverage and provide separate 
payments for any services that coverage is required for.135 Additionally, they must 
segregate premium revenue collected from an eligible organization from monies 
used to provide payment for contraceptive services, and they must provide notice to 
participants and beneficiaries of the availability of separate coverage. 136 
10.  The June 2013 Guidance Documents 
In June 2013, contemporaneous with the issuance of the final rules, the 
Administration issued two additional guidance documents. The first document 
extended the temporary enforcement safe harbor to encompass plan years beginning 
on or after August 1, 2013, and before January 1, 2014.137 The second was a self-
certification form for organizations seeking an accommodation under the final rules 
to execute.138  
C.  Some Observations Regarding the Processes Used to Develop the Mandate 
As the preceding review of the regulatory actions that implemented the mandate 
shows, the important policy decision to include contraceptive methods, sterilization 
procedures, and patient education and counseling within the preventive health 
services that must be covered without cost sharing was not made by the duly-elected 
                                                          
 132 Id. at 39,873–82. 
 133 Id. at 39,892. 
 134 Id. at 39,893, 39,895–96. 
 135 Id.  
 136 Id. at 39,893, 39,895–97. 
 137 Ctr. for Consumer Info. & Ins. Oversight (CCIIO), Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid 
Servs. (CMS), Guidance on the Temporary Enforcement Safe Harbor for Certain Employers, 
Group Health Plans and Group Health Insurance Issuers with Respect to the Requirement to 
Cover Contraceptive Services Without Cost Sharing Under Section 2713 of the Public Health 
Service Act, Section 715(a)(1) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, and Section 
9815(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code, CMS.GOV (June 28, 2013), https://www.cms.gov/ 
CCIIO/Resources/Regulations-and-Guidance/Downloads/preventive-services-guidance-6-28-
2013.pdf. 
 138 Ctr. for Consumer Info. & Ins. Oversight, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Self 
Certification Form, CMS.GOV (June 28, 2013), http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Forms-
Reports-and-Other-Resources/index.html#Prevention. 
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representatives of the American people serving in the U.S. Congress. In the ACA, 
Congress had not defined what would be included within the coverage package of 
preventive health services for women. Instead, it gave that decision-making 
responsibility to the executive branch, and consequently the decision was made by 
individuals within the Administration.  
The Departments chose to use truncated administrative rulemaking procedures to 
promulgate the mandate. By using the interim final rulemaking process, the 
Administration hindered meaningful public participation, hampered dialogue 
between policymakers and interested individuals and organizations, and prevented 
full vetting of the rules before they went into effect. In other words, the regulatory 
procedures chosen by the Administration thwarted what is supposed to be a 
transparent, deliberative rulemaking process in which the public has the opportunity 
to participate meaningfully. Consequently, the public’s interest in meaningful 
participation in administrative rulemaking and its interest in transparent, deliberative 
policy decision-making were not well served by the processes employed by the 
Administration to develop and impose the mandate.  
In the February/March 2012 timeframe, the Administration appeared to shift its 
approach to rulemaking regarding the mandate.139 In the March 2012 ANPRM, the 
Departments stated that they committed on February 10, 2012 (when they issued the 
“final-final rules” approving the amended interim final rules, the mandate, and the 
narrow religious-employer exemption) to working with stakeholders to ensure the 
provision of contraceptive coverage without cost sharing while accommodating 
certain nonprofit religious organizations that were opposed to providing the 
mandated coverage on religious grounds. That shift is also signaled by the 
Departments’ transition from using interim final rulemaking to the regular notice-
and-comment rulemaking process and their explanation of why they were issuing an 
ANPRM and providing for an extended comment period and listening sessions 
before issuing a subsequent proposed rulemaking and providing an additional 
opportunity to comment. In other words, from the February/March 2012 timeframe 
forward, the Departments manifested a willingness to permit meaningful public 
participation in rulemaking and the full vetting of the rules. However, at that point, 
the Department had already developed and promulgated the mandate. The only 
remaining issues were how narrow the religious-employer exemption would be, what 
sort of accommodations would be extended to certain non-exempt, nonprofit 
religious organizations, and how the accommodations would be administered. 
A review of the Departments’ rulemaking activities shows that, once the 
Administration had succeeded in establishing the mandate and thereby 
accomplishing its key social and political objectives, it slowed the rulemaking 
process down and began to employ standard procedures to allow public participation 
in decisions regarding the scope of the religious-employer exemption and the 
accommodation for nonprofit, religious organizations. In other words, when the 
Administration turned its attention to accommodating religious beliefs and 
conscience objections, it decided to take its time and give the public (including those 
opposed to a religious-employer exemption and any accommodation of nonprofit 
                                                          
 139 The year 2012 was a presidential election year, and the contraceptive coverage mandate 
had become a contentious issue. See Devin Dwyer, Poll: Americans Divided over 
Contraception Mandate, ABC NEWS (Feb. 14, 2012, 4:30 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/ 
politics/2012/02/poll-americans-divided-over-contraception-mandate/. 
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institutions) a full opportunity to comment on agency proposals. Considering that 
2012 was an election year, the shift would allow the Administration to employ the 
rhetoric of accommodation and public participation and to trumpet its work with 
stakeholders, the listening sessions, and the full vetting of its rules.  
The United States Supreme Court’s determination that the Administration’s 
mandate violates the RFRA was issued after the promulgation of rules and actions 
studied here, and its decision has necessitated additional rulemaking by the 
Departments.140 Accordingly, on August 27, 2014, four years after they issued their 
first set of interim final rules, the Departments issued more rules related to the 
mandate.141 The Departments issued their new rules for nonprofit organizations as 
interim final rules, setting the effective date as August 27, 2014, and requiring that 
comments be received by October 27, 2014.142 They issued their new rules for for-
profit organizations as proposed rules, and they specified that comments must be 
received on or before October 21, 2014, to be considered.143 
III.  ANALYSIS UNDER THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT 
In promulgating the mandate, the Departments undertook to create a “positive 
right” or entitlement to coverage of all FDA-approved contraceptive methods, 
sterilization procedures, and patient education and counseling.144 In creating this 
                                                          
 140 See infra Part III. 
 141 See Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 79 Fed. 
Reg. 51,092 (Aug. 27, 2014) [hereinafter August 2014 Interim Final Rules]; 79 Fed. Reg. 
51,118 [hereinafter August 2014 Proposed Rules]. An analysis of these new rules would 
extend this Article beyond the scope of the study undertaken here, which has focused on the 
rules up to their final form in July 2013. Additionally, these new rules were issued as this 
Article was being finalized for publication.  
 142 August 2014 Interim Final Rules, supra note 141, at 51,092. 
 143 August 2014 Proposed Rules, supra note 141, at 51,119. 
 144 Id. at 51,121. Philosopher Isaiah Berlin is typically credited with recognizing the basic 
distinction between negative rights or liberties and positive rights or liberties. See Isaiah 
Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118 (1969). As conventionally 
understood, the concept of negative rights entails freedom or protection from government 
action or interference (e.g., the freedom of religion and speech), and the concept of positive 
rights entails entitlement to government action or support (e.g., the right to education). See 
Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2271, 2272 (1990) 
(“No inquiry is more central to constitutional jurisprudence than the effort to delineate the 
duties of government. The courts’ approach to this complex subject has been dominated by 
reliance on a simple distinction between affirmative and negative responsibilities. Government 
is held solely to what courts characterize as a negative obligation: to refrain from acts that 
deprive citizens of protected rights. Obligations that courts conceive to be affirmative—duties 
to act, to provide, or to protect—are not enforceable constitutional rights.”); Mark Tushnet, An 
Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1363, 1364, 1392 (1984) (“Part of the conventional wisdom 
about rights distinguishes between negative rights—to be free from interference—and positive 
rights to have various things. People sympathetic to the party of humanity [(i.e., ‘progressive 
social forces’)] usually agree that the present balance between negative and positive rights is 
askew and that we should strengthen or create positive rights while preserving most of our 
negative rights. Yet, viewed pragmatically, it may be impossible to carry out that program. In 
our culture, the image of negative rights overshadows that of positive ones and may obstruct 
the expansion of positive rights.”). Courts have also recognized this distinction. See DeShaney 
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positive right, however, the federal government did not assume the affirmative 
responsibility of providing or paying for the coverage. Rather, under the ACA and 
the Administration’s rules, the federal government required group health plans, 
health insurance issuers, and employers to take action or provide support by making 
them responsible for providing services prescribed by a health care provider and 
used by the patient.145 In other words, the Administration made third parties to health 
care provider-patient relationships responsible for the entitlement of patients by 
requiring them to pay for the services.146  
More than 300 individuals and entities filed over 100 cases challenging the 
mandate and the burden the Administration placed upon them to pay for these 
services.147 Almost an equal number of cases have been brought by for-profit 
organizations as by nonprofit organizations.148 In these challenges, the litigants have 
argued that they are opposed on religious and moral grounds to the federal 
government requiring them to pay for certain specified services to which they object 
on religious and moral grounds.149 Among the principal claims alleged by the 
plaintiffs in these cases are claims under the First Amendment and RFRA.150  
These challenges focus attention on the conflict the Administration precipitated 
between the positive right to contraceptive coverage created by its regulatory rule 
and the negative right of religious freedom recognized in the First Amendment and 
reinforced in RFRA, which afford protection from government interference.151 As 
the discussion above and below shows, the Departments failed to consider the First 
Amendment and RFRA until after they had developed and imposed the mandate, and 
when they did finally consider the First Amendment and RFRA, it was only in the 
context of their narrow religious-employer exemption and their narrow 
accommodations for certain non-exempt, nonprofit religious organizations with 
religious objections to paying for the services.152 The Administration’s failure to 
consider the application of the First Amendment and RFRA left the mandate 
                                                          
v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195–96 (1989); id. at 204 (Brennan, 
J., dissenting); Slade v. Bd. of Sch. Dir. of City of Milwaukee, 702 F.3d 1027, 1031 (7th Cir. 
2012).  
 145 See August 2014 Proposed Rules, supra note 141, at 51,122. For a discussion of the 
statutory and regulatory developments that led to the mandate, see infra Part II.  
 146 The third-party payment structure is an established part of health care financing in the 
United States. See Thomas Bodenheimer & Kevin Grumbach, Paying for Health Care, 272 
JAMA 634 (Aug. 24, 1994).  
 147 See HHS Mandate Information Central, THE BECKET FUND, 
http://www.becketfund.org/hhsinformationcentral (last visited Nov. 8, 2014). 
 148 See id. 
 149 See, e.g., Eternal World Television Network, Inc. v. Burwell, 756 F.3d 1339, 1348 (11th 
Cir. 2014); Nebraska ex rel. Bruning v. Sebelius, 877 F.Supp. 2d 777, 788 (D. Neb. 2012). 
 150 Eternal World Television Network, 756 F.3d at 1348 (“The Network alleged that the 
mandate violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, the First Amendment, the Fifth 
Amendment, and the Administrative Procedure Act.”); Sebelius, 877 F.Supp. 2d at 788 
(alleging violations of the First Amendment and RFRA). 
 151 See supra note 144 and sources cited therein. 
 152 See supra Part II.B; infra Part III.A. 
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vulnerable to challenge, and the RFRA claim ultimately succeeded because 
Congress, in RFRA, had required the federal government to meet a high standard to 
justify burdens it places on the negative right of religious freedom.153  
The RFRA analysis performed here proceeds by first evaluating the 
Departments’ consideration of (and failure to consider) RFRA in their rulemakings. 
It then outlines the test established by Congress in RFRA and studies the Supreme 
Court’s recent ruling that the mandate violates RFRA. The analysis concludes with a 
brief, selective survey of other challenges to the mandate. 
A.  The Departments’ Rulemakings 
During the course of their rulemakings, the Departments failed to give adequate 
consideration to religious freedom and the requirements of the First Amendment and 
RFRA. The Departments did not consider the First Amendment or RFRA at any 
point in the interim final rules or in the regulatory materials accompanying the rules 
issued in July 2010.154 Likewise, the Departments considered neither the First 
Amendment nor RFRA at any point in the amended interim final rules or in the 
regulatory materials accompanying the rules issued in August 2011.155 
By the time of the August 2011 rulemaking, the Administration’s mandate that 
group health plans, health insurance issuers, and many employers cover all FDA-
approved contraceptive methods, sterilization procedures, and patient education and 
counseling was approved and in place.156 In that rulemaking, the Departments 
indicated that they had received comments from the public and interested persons as 
to their July 2010 interim final rules that raised concerns regarding religious 
institutions, and in response to those comments, they authorized HRSA to establish a 
religious-employer exemption and promulgated a definition of religious employers 
that governed the scope of that exemption.157 And, yet, despite their acknowledged 
awareness that their rules raised concerns for religious institutions, the Departments 
did not analyze their regulatory action under the First Amendment or RFRA or 
evaluate how the First Amendment or RFRA applied to their actions and the burdens 
they were imposing on any nonprofit organizations, religious institutions, or for-
profit organizations. 
The Departments first considered the potential application of the First 
Amendment and RFRA in February 2012 when they adopted their July 2010 interim 
final rules and August 2011 amended interim final rules as final rules without 
change.158 In those final-final rules, the Departments announced the one-year 
                                                          
 153 See infra Part III.B.  
 154 See supra Part II.B.1. Considering Planned Parenthood’s contemporaneous 
announcement of its campaign to include all-FDA approved contraceptives in HRSA’s 
Women’s Preventive Services Guidelines and HHS’s representation that these guidelines were 
already in development, the Departments cannot reasonably argue that the controversy 
surrounding the mandate was not foreseeable. See Part II.B.1. 
 155 See supra Part II.B.4. 
 156 See supra Parts II.B.2–4. Additionally, neither the Committee that recommended 
coverage of these services nor HRSA that issued the Women’s Preventive Services Guidelines 
considered the application of the First Amendment and RFRA. 
 157 See supra Part II.B.4. 
 158 See supra Part II.B.5. 
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enforcement safe harbor for certain non-exempt, nonprofit religious organizations 
with religious objections, and their plan to develop accommodations for such 
organizations.159 Their consideration of the First Amendment and RFRA was, 
however, limited in scope, focusing on their approach of providing a narrow 
religious-employer exemption, creating the temporary enforcement safe harbor, and 
developing some narrowly defined accommodations.160  
Furthermore, although the Departments considered the First Amendment and 
RFRA in their February 2012 rulemaking, their consideration was superficial and 
conclusory.161 As to the First Amendment, the Departments asserted that the mandate 
was “generally applicable and designed to serve the compelling public health and 
gender equity goals described” in the regulatory materials and that the mandate “is in 
no way specifically targeted at religion or religious practices.”162 The Departments’ 
consideration of RFRA was even more cursory: “[the Departments’] approach 
complies with [RFRA], which generally requires a federal law to not substantially 
burden religious exercise, or, if it does substantially burden religious exercise, to be 
the least restrictive means to further a compelling government interest.”163 In the 
regulatory materials accompanying their final-final rules, the Departments provided 
no further discussion of the constitutional and statutory standards or contemplated 
any alternative means of promoting their stated interests.164 
In their July 2013 rulemaking, nearly two full years after the mandate was firmly 
in place, the Departments finally gave something more than passing consideration to 
some religious freedom issues created by the mandate.165 In that nearly two-year 
period, commenters on the rules had raised concerns regarding religious freedom, 
conscience, and moral objections to abortion and contraceptives.166 Additionally, 
litigation had been instituted as early as November and December 2011,167 just a few 
months after the contraceptive mandate was in place in August 2011, and those cases 
presented claims under the First Amendment and RFRA.168 Both Planned 
Parenthood and the USCCB had publicly expressed opposing views on the mandate 
and communicated with the Administration.169 Furthermore, the HHS-funded IOM 
                                                          
 159 See supra Part II.B.5. 
 160 See supra Part II.B.5. 
 161 See supra Part II.B.5. 
 162 See Final Rules, supra note 59, at 8729. In this same paragraph, the Departments recited 
aspects of the applicable constitutional standard: “The Supreme Court has held that the First 
Amendment right to free exercise of religion is not violated by a law that is not specifically 
targeted at religiously motived conduct and that applies equally to conduct without regard to 
whether it is religiously motivated—a so-called neutral law of general applicability.” Id. 
 163 Id. 
 164 See id. at 8725–30. 
 165 See supra Part II.B.9. 
 166 See Amended Interim Final Rules, supra note 43, at 46,623–24; Final Rules, supra note 
59, at 8726–27; July 2013 Final Rules, supra note 17, at 39,886–88. 
 167 See supra note 62 and sources cited therein. 
 168 Id. 
 169 See supra notes 2728–29 and accompanying text. 
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Committee had given representatives of such groups as Planned Parenthood, the 
Guttmacher Institute, and the National Women’s Law Center opportunity to shape 
the views of Committee members on the issues, influence the development of its 
recommendation, and help build “the record” that the Departments would rely on in 
their rulemaking.170 
In the July 2013 rulemaking, the Departments’ consideration of the First 
Amendment and RFRA was focused on the exemption and the proposed 
accommodations.171 In the regulatory materials, the Departments expressed their 
belief that the exemption and the accommodations did not violate the Establishment 
Clause because they were available on an equal basis to any and all religions.172 
Likewise, in their view, the exemption and the accommodations did not violate the 
Free Exercise Clause because they were neutral and generally applicable, did not 
target religiously motivated conduct, and served to accommodate religion, not to 
disfavor it.173  
As to RFRA, the Departments expressed their view that accommodations were 
not required by RFRA.174 Additionally, in their view, “the accommodations” did not 
violate RFRA for several reasons: (1) they did not substantially burden religious 
exercise; (2) they served two compelling government interests, namely, safeguarding 
public health by expanding access to and utilization of recommended preventive 
services, and ensuring that women have equal access to health care services; and (3) 
they were the least restrictive means to achieve those interests.175 The Departments 
disagreed with commenters who expressed concern that, even with the 
accommodations, their organizations were required to be involved in providing 
coverage of objectionable services, to provide the self-certification, and to fund or 
subsidize coverage, and they disputed the claims of commenters who argued that 
alternative means were available.176  
At no point in these rulemakings did the Departments evaluate the application of 
the First Amendment or RFRA to the burdens the mandate imposed on the religious 
freedom and consciences of for-profit organizations and the individuals who own 
them. Similarly, at no point in these rulemakings did the Department consider 
carefully under RFRA questions regarding the scope of the religious-employer 
exemption. Furthermore, as shown above, what consideration the Departments did 
give to religious freedom and moral objections to the mandate was late and 
insufficient to address those concerns meaningfully.  
B.  The RFRA Standard 
During the period when the Departments were developing and finalizing the 
mandate, RFRA provided one of the primary standards for evaluating whether and 
                                                          
 170 See supra Part II.B.2. 
 171 See July 2013 Final Rules, supra note 17, at 39,886–88. 
 172 See id. at 39,888. 
 173 Id.  
 174 Id. at 39,886. 
 175 Id. at 39,886–87. 
 176 See id. at 39,887–88. 
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under what circumstances the federal government may impose a specific burden on 
religious freedom. In 1993, Congress passed RFRA, and President Clinton signed it 
into law.177 In passing this legislation, Congress acted with virtual unanimity in 
response to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Employment Division v. Smith.178 In Smith, 
the Court had held that, under the First Amendment, neutral, generally applicable 
laws may be applied to religious practices even when not supported by a compelling 
governmental interest.179  
In RFRA, Congress mandated broad protection for religious liberty, and this is 
reflected in the legislative findings. Congress found that the free exercise of religion 
is an unalienable right protected in the First Amendment and that religious exercise 
is burdened by “laws ‘neutral’ toward religion . . . as surely as laws intended to 
interfere with religious exercise.”180 According to Congress, the government must 
have a compelling interest to substantially burden religious exercise, and the Court in 
Smith had “virtually eliminated the requirement that the government [must] justify 
burdens on religious exercise imposed by laws neutral toward religion.”181 Congress 
deemed the compelling interest standard “a workable test” for striking “sensible 
balances” between religious liberty and governmental interests.182 In enacting RFRA, 
Congress was motivated by two purposes: (1) restoring the compelling interest test 
that the Court approved in Sherbert v. Verner and Wisconsin v. Yoder, and requiring 
its application in all cases where the free exercise of religion is substantially 
burdened; and (2) providing a claim or defense to persons whose religious exercise is 
substantially burdened by government.183 
Accordingly, under RFRA, the federal government may “not substantially burden 
a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general 
applicability,” except when it meets two requirements.184 When the government’s 
action substantially burdens religious exercise, it must demonstrate that the burden 
(1) promotes a compelling governmental interest and (2) is the least restrictive 
means of furthering that interest.185 RFRA defines “exercise of religion” and 
“religious exercise” broadly to include “any exercise of religion whether or not 
compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.”186 
                                                          
 177 Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 107 Stat. 1488, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq. 
 178 See Emp. Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 179 See id. at 877–90. See also City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 514 (1997) 
(discussing Smith) 
 180 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a) (2012). 
 181 Id. 
 182 Id. 
 183 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b) (2012) (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); 
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)). 
 184 Id. § 2000bb-1(a). 
 185 Id. § 2000bb-1(b). 
 186 Id. §§ 2000bb-2(4), 2000cc-5(7)(A) 
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Under RFRA, a person whose religious exercise is burdened may bring a claim 
asserting a violation of RFRA and obtain appropriate relief.187 The religious claimant 
must establish a prima facie case by showing the following: (1) a burdened practice 
is an exercise of religion; (2) the burdened religious practice is sincere; and (3) the 
burden is substantial.188 The federal government then carries the burden of proof and 
must demonstrate that its application of the law (1) is in furtherance of a compelling 
governmental interest and (2) is the least restrictive means of achieving that 
interest.189 
As noted earlier, the Departments did not consider the application of this 
standard to their mandate in the July 2010 rulemaking or the August 2011 
rulemaking.190 Even in the February 2012 rulemaking, when they finalized without 
any change their interim final rules, they did not apply this standard—they merely 
recited it.191 The Departments did not apply this standard to the mandate until the 
July 2013 rulemaking when they completed their rulemaking on the mandate; but, 
even then, the Departments’ consideration of the standard was focused on the 
accommodations.192 At no point during the three-year history of their rulemakings on 
the mandate did the Departments consider the application of this standard to their 
requirement that for-profit organizations provide the mandated coverage.193 Thus, the 
for-profit litigants who challenged the mandate and the courts that heard those 
challenges performed an analysis under RFRA that the Departments themselves had 
failed to perform in their rulemakings.194  
C.  The Supreme Court’s Ruling 
On June 30, 2014, the Supreme Court issued its ruling holding that the 
Administration’s mandate violated RFRA.195 The specific question decided by the 
                                                          
 187 Id. § 2000bb-1(c). Under RFRA, standing is determined “by the general rules of 
standing under article III of the Constitution.” Id. 
 188 Cf. Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 428 
(2006). 
 189 42 U.S.C § 2000bb-1(b). Under RFRA, “demonstrates” means “meets the burdens of 
going forward with the evidence and of persuasion.” See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2(3) (2000). 
 190 See supra Part III.A. 
 191 See supra Parts II.B.5, III.A. 
 192 See supra Part III.A. 
 193 For a more extensive review of this rulemaking making history, see supra Parts II.B, 
III.A. 
 194 Even if the Departments believed that for-profit entities are not persons under RFRA, 
the RFRA analysis would still be warranted to give the public a rational explanation for their 
decisions in the rulemaking. More importantly, the question whether for-profit entities are 
persons under RFRA was at least a debatable issue, and the Departments were not warranted 
in assuming they were not.  
 195 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2751, 2758 (2014), aff’g Hobby Lobby 
Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013), and rev’g and remanding Conestoga 
Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, 724 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 2013). Justice Kennedy concurred 
in the Court’s opinion, but wrote a separate concurring opinion. He emphasized that the 
Court’s opinion is premised upon “its assumption” that the government has “a legitimate and 
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Court was whether RFRA permits HHS “to demand that three closely held 
corporations provide health-insurance coverage for methods of contraception that 
violate the sincerely held religious beliefs of the companies’ owners.”196  
The Court determined that for-profit corporations (and individuals like the 
Greens and the Hahns who own and control them) are persons under RFRA and that 
protecting the religious freedom of corporations protects the religious freedom of the 
individuals who own and control them.197 According to the Court, in RFRA, 
Congress did not discriminate against owners of companies who desire to operate 
their businesses in a manner required by their religious beliefs when they decide to 
organize their businesses as corporations, as opposed to sole proprietorships or 
general partnerships.198 Accordingly, federal regulations that restrict the activities of 
for-profit closely-held corporations must conform to the requirements of RFRA.199 
As to the prima facie case that the companies had to show, the Court determined 
that the mandate substantially burdens religious exercise.200 The Court explained that 
the Greens and the Hahns sincerely believe that life begins at conception, that they 
object to providing health insurance that covers methods that may result in the 
destruction of an embryo, and that the mandate requires them to “engage in conduct 
that seriously violates their religious beliefs.”201 Finally, if the Greens and the Hahns 
                                                          
compelling interest in the health of female employees” but that the government has failed to 
show that it is using the least restrictive means, especially considering that the government 
had allowed a seemingly workable accommodation for other organizations that object on 
religious grounds. Hobby Lobby Stores, 134 S.Ct. at 2786. He also observed that the 
government has available to it the means of reconciling “two priorities”: “no person may be 
restricted or demeaned by government in exercising his or her religion,” and “that same 
exercise [may not] unduly restrict other persons, such as employees, in protecting their own 
interests, interests the law deems compelling.” Id. at 2786–87.  
  Justice Ginsburg dissented and wrote an opinion that Justice Sotomayor joined in its 
entirety and that Justices Breyer and Kagan joined as to all but Part III-C-1. Justice Ginsburg 
expressed concern that the Court’s decision was startlingly broad, allowing “commercial 
enterprises, including corporations, along with partnerships and sole proprietorships, [to] opt 
out of any law (saving only tax laws) they judge incompatible with their sincerely held 
religious beliefs.” Id. at 2787. In her view, any free exercise claim under the First Amendment 
is foreclosed by Employment Division v. Smith because the mandate applies generally, is 
aimed at the wellbeing of women, and would at most have an incidental effect on religious 
exercise. Id. at 2790. Additionally, Justice Ginsburg understood the RFRA claim to fail on 
every element: for-profit corporations do not exercise religion and thus do not qualify as 
persons under RFRA for purposes of an exemption from the law; the mandate does not 
substantially burden the religious exercise of the corporations or the families; the government 
has shown that its interests in public health and the wellbeing of women are compelling; and 
the government has shown that there is no less restrictive, equally effective means to satisfy 
the religious objections and carry out the objective in the mandate. Id. at 2793–2803. 
 196 Id. at 2759. 
 197 See id. at 2767–75. 
 198 See id. at 2759–60. 
 199 See id. at 2775. 
 200 Id. at 2775–79. 
 201 Id. at 2775. 
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(and their companies) fail to comply with the government’s mandate, the Court 
observed, they will suffer serious economic consequences from the penalties 
imposed by the government.202 The Court thus determined that the government’s 
mandate, coupled with its coercive power to enforce the mandate by imposing 
substantial penalties, substantially burdens religious freedom. 
As to the government’s showing under RFRA, the Court assumed without 
deciding that the interest in guaranteeing cost-free access to the four challenged 
contraceptive methods is compelling, and the Court then turned to the question of the 
least restrictive means of furthering that interest.203 The Court observed that the 
government itself could assume the cost of providing the four objectionable 
contraceptive methods and that the government had not shown that that alternative 
was not viable, especially considering that the ACA’s insurance-coverage provisions 
will require the government to assume over $1.3 trillion in costs over the next 
decade.204 The Court added: “If, as HHS tells us, providing all women with cost-free 
access to all FDA-approved methods of contraception is a Government interest of 
the highest order, it is hard to understand HHS’s argument that it cannot be required 
under RFRA to pay anything in order to achieve this important goal.”205 But, in the 
Court’s view, it was the Administration’s accommodation of nonprofit organizations 
with religious objections that most clearly demonstrated the availability of a less 
restrictive alternative.206 Thus, the Court determined that the federal government had 
failed to carry its burden of showing that the mandate is the least restrictive means of 
furthering the government’s interest. The mandate was found, as a result, to violate 
RFRA as applied to closely-held corporations.207 
D.  Other Challenges 
In the cases brought by Hobby Lobby Stores and Conestoga Wood Specialties, 
the Supreme Court determined that the mandate violates RFRA as applied to closely-
held for-profit corporations. Dozens of cases filed by nonprofit organizations remain 
pending.208 In Wheaton College v. Burwell, the Court issued an order on the religious 
nonprofit college’s application for injunction pending appeal.209 The Court enjoined 
the government from enforcing against Wheaton College “the challenged provisions 
of the [ACA] and related regulations pending final disposition of appellate review,” 
if the college notifies HHS in writing that “it is a nonprofit organization that holds 
itself out as religious and has religious objections to providing coverage for 
                                                          
 202 See id. at  2775–76. 
 203 See id. at 2779–80. 
 204 See id. at 2780–81 (citing estimates by the Congressional Budget Office). 
 205 Id. at 2781 (emphasis in original). 
 206 See id. at 2781–82. 
 207 See id. at 2785. The Court concluded that it did not need to reach the First Amendment 
free exercise claim because its decision on the statutory issue resolved the question. Id. 
 208 See HHS Mandate Information Central, THE BECKET FUND, 
http://www.becketfund.org/hhsinformationcentral/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2014). 
 209 Wheaton College v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2806 (2014). 
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contraceptive services.”210 The college objected to providing its health insurance 
issuer and third-party administrator notice of its objection, which would trigger the 
obligation of the issuer and administrator to provide coverage.211 In Little Sisters of 
the Poor Home for the Aged v. Sebelius, the Court had issued a similar order 
enjoining the federal government from enforcing the mandate, and the Little Sisters 
had likewise objected to completing the requisite form and sending copies to third-
party administrators.212 
On August 27, 2014, the Departments issued more interim final rules and 
proposed rules regarding coverage of certain preventive services under the ACA.213 
In the interim final rules, the Departments added to the existing rules based upon the 
Court’s ruling in the Wheaton College case and provided an alternative process for 
eligible organizations to provide notice of their religious objections to contraceptive 
coverage.214 In the proposed rules, the Departments proposed changing the definition 
of eligible organization in their rules based upon the Court’s ruling in the Hobby 
Lobby Stores case.215 
Given the number of pending cases, and the additional rulemakings by the 
Departments, litigation challenging the mandate is likely to persist for some time. It 
remains to be seen how the Court’s ruling in the Hobby Lobby Stores case will be 
applied to other for-profit businesses and to the wide range of nonprofit 
organizations and individuals challenging the mandate.  
The mandate’s complicated regulatory history and the three years of litigation 
challenging the mandate highlight fundamental failures in the Administration’s 
approach to establishing the mandate through agency rulemaking. The Departments 
chose to use the interim final rulemaking process that, while accelerating 
rulemaking, restricted and delayed meaningful participation by the public, including 
the participation of individuals and organizations adversely affected by the mandate. 
The Departments’ choice to use this truncated rulemaking process hampered 
deliberation and deprived them of feedback from the public that would have led to 
more carefully reasoned rulemakings. Had the Departments chosen to use the 
standard notice-and-comment rulemaking process, issues under the First 
Amendment and RFRA would have likely come into focus earlier, and the 
Departments could have addressed those issues earlier. As it was, the Departments 
were years behind in performing the statutorily-required analysis under RFRA. 
Moreover, in their rulemakings, they never performed the RFRA analysis as to the 
burden their mandate imposed on for-profit organizations. Consequently, the 
Departments invited trouble by leaving the performance of that analysis to litigants 
and the courts. 
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 212 See Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged v. Sebelius, 134 S. Ct. 1022 (2014). 
 213 See August 2014 Interim Final Rules, supra note 141; August 2014 Proposed Rules, 
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IV.  ANALYSIS UNDER A PUBLIC HEALTH POLICY AND ETHICS FRAMEWORK 
The contraceptive coverage mandate is a public health initiative. Consequently, a 
public health policy and ethics analysis is warranted. The analysis performed here 
employs a public health policy and ethics framework proposed by a team of 
bioethicists and public health law and policy experts. This analysis begins with an 
overview of that framework and then evaluates the Administration’s mandate under 
the team’s proposed analytical structure.  
A.  The ACA, the Mandate, Public Health, and Social Justice 
As discussed earlier, Congress in the ACA mandated that group health plans, 
health insurance issuers, and many employers cover categories of preventive health 
services with no cost sharing.216 In implementing these ACA provisions, the 
Administration decided to include within the preventive health services coverage 
package all FDA-approved contraceptive methods, sterilization procedures, and 
patient education and counseling.217 In mandating coverage of preventive health 
services, which now includes contraceptive and sterilization services, Congress and 
the Administration decided to make use of health plans, health insurance issuers, and 
employers in the federal government’s effort to promote public health.218  
The decision of Congress and the Administration to cast the mandate in the mold 
of public health is significant. Health care and medicine are oriented primarily to 
individuals.219 In health care, attention is centered on the physician-patient 
                                                          
 216 See supra Part II.A. 
 217 See supra Part II.B. 
 218 See Michael J. DeBoer, Access Without Limits? Revisiting Barriers and Boundaries 
After the Affordable Care Act, 4 CONN. L. REV. 1239, 1257–58 & n.65 (2012). See also John 
D. Blum, The Naprapath in the Rainforest, 18 NEXUS J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 3, 7–8 (2012–2013) 
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Aloysius Cogan, Jr., The Affordable Care Act’s Preventive Services Mandate: Breaking Down 
the Barriers to Nationwide Access to Preventive Services, 39 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 355, 355 
(2011) (“By requiring . . . health plans to provide evidence-based preventive services with no 
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MED. & ETHICS 317, 322 (2011) (discussing insurance reforms in the ACA and major 
provisions affecting public health and stating that another set of ACA reforms “addresses the 
demand for public health services by eliminating barriers to preventive services. [Q]ualified 
health plans can no longer impose costs on patients for services deemed beneficial by the 
[USPSTF] or for immunizations recommended by the [ACIP]. Preventive care for infants, 
children, adolescents, and women recommended by the [HRSA] will similarly be free of 
charge.”). 
 219 See LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 16 (2d ed. 
2008). 
2015] LEGISLATING MORALITY PROGRESSIVELY 95 
 
relationship, and in therapeutic relationships, physicians act in the best interests of 
their patients, providing care to diagnose and treat injury and illness and to cure 
disease.220 By contrast, public health focuses on populations and government efforts 
to promote the health of populations and to prevent injury, illness, disease, and 
disability.221 Consequently, in public health, the focus is not on the care of individual 
patients.222 Public health has traditionally aimed to promote the common good 
through government efforts to collect and analyze data and then intervene to prevent 
and reduce risks and harms.223 Traditional public health activities included disease 
surveillance, sanitation, injury prevention, and infectious disease control and 
prevention.224 Through these and similar efforts, governments have sought to address 
the underlying causes of disease and disability in populations.225 
Over the last two decades, some public health experts and bioethicists have 
advocated a broader, more comprehensive vision of public health and its mission.226 
According to this vision, the mission of public health becomes a large, all-
encompassing endeavor to address a wide range of social, economic, and 
environmental “determinants of health” and to ensure a fair allocation of 
resources.227 Acting pursuant to this enlarged vision, progressives have undertaken to 
use government power, including its power to coerce conduct, to change 
socioeconomic conditions and restructure society.228  
These progressives have assigned moral force to their agenda by appropriating 
the language and values of social justice.229 For instance, Professor Lawrence O. 
Gostin wrote: 
Social justice is viewed as so central to the mission of public health that it 
has been described as the field’s core value: “The historic dream of public 
health . . . is a dream of social justice.” Among the most basic and 
commonly understood meanings of justice is fair, equitable, and 
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 221 See id. at 16–17, 19. 
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 224 See id. at 39. 
 225 See id. The Institute of Medicine’s influential report in 1988 defined public health as 
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appropriate treatment in light of what is due or owed to individuals and 
groups.230 
The pursuit of social justice can thus inspire ambitious programs and policies to 
improve the health of populations and to ensure “fair” treatment by addressing 
“persistent patterns of systematic disadvantage” and altering social and economic 
conditions.231  
Although contraceptive methods and sterilization procedures may be prescribed 
for either medical or public health purposes,232 the Administration located the 
contraceptive coverage mandate squarely within this broader progressive vision of 
public health.233 As the regulatory materials indicate, the Departments intended the 
mandate to further two large social goals: (1) public health and (2) gender equity.234 
Furthermore, in the litigation before the Supreme Court, the Administration 
defended the mandate on public health and gender equality grounds.235  
Additionally, Professor Lawrence O. Gostin, one of the foremost experts on 
public health law and policy in this country, framed the mandate as a public health 
initiative and situated it within the context of this enlarged vision. In the Hobby 
Lobby Stores litigation before the Supreme Court, Professor Gostin and other public 
health and foreign and comparative law experts filed an amicus brief (the Gostin 
                                                          
 230 Id. at 21 (quoting Dan E. Beauchamp, Public Health as Social Justice, in NEW ETHICS 
FOR THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH 105-14 (Dan E. Beauchamp & Bonnie Steinbock, eds., 1999) 
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 231 See GOSTIN, supra note 219, at 22. 
 232 See Blum, supra note 218, at 8. 
 233 The IOM Committee’s report reflects the public health orientation of the mandate as 
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II.B.5, II.B.9. 
 235 See Brief for Respondent at 10, 42, 48, Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 
1536 (2014) (No.13-356). See also supra Part III.  
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Brief) supporting the government’s position.236 The Gostin Brief highlighted the 
public health orientation of the mandate: “These cases present the questions whether 
and to what extent for-profit corporations that claim religious objection to providing 
health insurance plans that cover contraception can refuse to comply with a public 
health law as a so-called conscientious objector.”237 The brief also argued that 
contraceptive access is “an essential component of women’s human rights” and that 
such access “may not be circumscribed by the assertion of religious convictions by 
for-profit corporations.”238 According to the brief, the right of women to access 
health care and family planning, including contraception, receives priority in foreign 
law sources over a limited right of conscientious objection, and conscientious 
objector rights are recognized only for individuals, not for-profit corporations.239 
Although the Gostin Brief argued that these limitations on conscientious objection 
comport with the Supreme Court’s religious freedom jurisprudence, the brief did not 
cite or discuss RFRA or RFRA’s amplification of the negative right of religious 
freedom that is recognized in the First Amendment.240  
B.  A Brief Overview of the Analytical Framework 
Professor James F. Childress, Professor Gostin, and several colleagues in the 
field of public health have observed that inadequate attention has been afforded to 
certain concepts, methods, and boundaries in public health ethics.241 In an effort to 
address that deficiency, they have offered “a conceptual map of the terrain of public 
health ethics,” which includes a set of general moral considerations and a set of 
justificatory conditions.242 The analysis here will use their framework to evaluate the 
contraceptive coverage mandate as a public health initiative. 
                                                          
 236 See Brief for Foreign and Comparative Law Experts Lawrence O. Gostin et al. as Amici 
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1. The General Moral Considerations  
In their framework, Childress and his colleagues began with the recognition that 
government has a duty to justify public health policies. They wrote: “In a liberal, 
pluralistic democracy, the justification of coercive policies, as well as other policies, 
must rest on moral reasons that the public in whose name the policies are carried out 
could reasonably be expected to accept.”243 The general moral considerations, 
“clusters of moral concepts and norms” that may be “variously called values, 
principles, or rules,”244 provide concrete moral guidance in evaluating particular 
public health policies, practices, and actions.245 They observed that public health 
activities generally have a teleological and consequentialist orientation and that the 
end is the public’s health.246 Consequently, utility-balancing factors prominently in 
their analytical framework, as will be evident from the discussion that follows.247  
a. The Nine General Moral Considerations  
Childress and his colleagues identified the following set of general moral 
considerations for deliberating about and justifying particular public health policies, 
practices, and actions: 
(1) Benefits—whether the policy or activity produces benefits; 
(2) Harms—whether the policy or activity avoids, prevents, and removes 
harms; 
(3) Utility—whether the policy or activity produces the maximal balance of 
benefits over harms and other costs; 
(4) Justice—whether the policy or activity distributes benefits and burdens 
fairly (distributive justice) and results from a deliberative process that 
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ensured public participation, including the participation of affected parties 
(procedural justice); 
(5) Autonomy/liberty—whether the policy or activity respects autonomous 
choices and actions, including liberty of action; 
(6) Privacy/confidentiality—whether the policy or activity protects privacy and 
confidentiality; 
(7) Integrity—whether policymakers have kept promises and commitments; 
(8) Transparency—whether policymakers have disclosed information and 
spoken truthfully; and 
(9) Trust—whether policymakers have built and maintained public trust.248 
For Childress and his colleagues, these considerations constitute the moral 
content of public health ethics, but the considerations need further specification as to 
their meaning and scope.249 Moreover, each consideration provides guidance as to 
the appropriateness of particular policies and activities. At times, they lend support 
for particular policies or activities, and at other times, they counsel limitations.250 
Additionally, some considerations may conflict with other considerations in the 
context of particular policies or activities.251 
b. The Balancing of General Moral Considerations of Indeterminate Weight 
or Strength 
According to Childress and his colleagues, these general moral considerations are 
not absolute, and they have no specific weight or strength.252 In particular instances, 
some considerations may need to yield to other considerations.253 Additionally, when 
considerations conflict, Childress and his colleagues prefer a balancing approach 
based upon the unique situations and contexts encountered rather than an approach 
of assigning priority status to certain considerations or determining their relative 
weights in advance.254 Under this balancing approach, circumstances and contexts 
are understood to affect the relative weights of the considerations.255  
Although Childress and his colleagues eschew prioritizing considerations or 
determining their relative weights in advance of a conflict, they view the first three 
general moral considerations—producing benefits, preventing harms, and 
maximizing utility—as providing “prima facie warrant” for public health 
activities.256 Additionally, they single out justice, autonomy/liberty, and 
privacy/confidentiality as “particularly noteworthy.”257 Nevertheless, in their view, 
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each of the general moral considerations provides guidance in the process of 
evaluating and justifying particular public health policies and activities. 
2. The Justificatory Conditions 
Childress and his colleagues proposed five justificatory conditions—
effectiveness, proportionality, necessity, least infringement, and public 
justification—to resolve conflicts among the general moral considerations.258 They 
focus primarily upon “conflict between the general moral considerations that are 
generally taken to instantiate the goal of public health—producing benefits, 
preventing harms, and maximizing utility—and those that express other moral 
commitments.”259 These justificatory conditions, they thought, could help determine 
“whether promoting public health warrants overriding” other considerations and 
values.260  
Their five proposed justificatory conditions include some specific requirements: 
(1) Effectiveness: Proponents of a particular public health policy or activity 
that infringes one or more general moral considerations must show that the 
proposed policy or activity will realize its goal and protect public health.  
(2) Proportionality: Proponents must balance positive features and benefits 
against negative features and undesirable consequences and show that 
probable public health benefits outweigh infringed general moral 
considerations. 
(3) Necessity: Proponents must show that a policy or activity is necessary to 
realize the public health goal and adopt an effective alternative that is less 
problematic when available. Proponents of a coercive policy or activity 
carry the burden of moral proof and must show that such an approach is 
necessary. 
(4) Least infringement: Proponents must seek to minimize infringement of 
general moral considerations (a) by adopting the least restrictive or the least 
intrusive alternative, (b) by restricting the scope of the policy to safeguard 
threatened interests, and (c) by limiting the policy to the scope necessary to 
achieve the public health goal. 
(5) Public justification: Proponents must explain and justify any infringement 
of one or more general moral considerations to the relevant parties, 
including those adversely affected. In order to build and maintain public 
trust and establish public accountability, proponents must allow affected 
parties to provide input into the formulation of policy, and they must be 
transparent by treating citizens as equals and with respect by offering moral 
reasons that in principle they could find acceptable.261 
C.  An Application of the Analytical Framework 
As of the July 2013 rulemaking, the Administration imposed the contraceptive 
coverage mandate broadly on group health plans, health insurance issuers, and many 
employers, providing only a narrow religious-employer exemption and narrowly-
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defined accommodations for non-exempt, nonprofit religious organizations that 
object on religious grounds.262 As of the time of that rulemaking, the Administration 
did not exempt or accommodate any for-profit organizations that have religious or 
moral objections.263 
1. The First Three General Moral Considerations 
In their July 2010 rulemaking, the Departments discussed benefits, costs, and 
transfers of costs associated with the coverage of preventive services without cost 
sharing in general.264 They also discussed the estimated number of affected entities, 
various types of anticipated benefits, and alternatives considered regarding the 
rulemaking.265 In this rulemaking, the Departments mandated, with respect to 
women, coverage of preventive care and screenings provided for in comprehensive 
guidelines supported by HRSA.266 Those comprehensive guidelines regarding 
preventive care and screening for women, the Departments announced, were under 
development and expected no later than August 1, 2011.267 Consequently, in that 
rulemaking, the Departments could not have evaluated the benefits, the harms, or the 
utility of the contraceptive coverage mandate. 
In July 2011, the IOM Committee issued its report recommending coverage of all 
FDA-approved contraceptive methods, sterilization procedures, and patient 
education and counseling.268 The Committee addressed scientific evidence related to 
this recommendation in just eight pages of its 200-plus page report.269 The 
Committee viewed unintended pregnancies (either unwanted or mistimed) as a harm 
and prevention of unintended pregnancies as a benefit.270 The Committee discussed 
the prevalence of unintended pregnancies and referenced documentation as to the 
consequences of unintended pregnancy for the mother and the baby, but it 
acknowledged that research is limited as to some outcomes.271 The Committee 
reviewed reports and literature discussing consequences resulting from unintended 
pregnancies, including breastfeeding patterns, depression, happiness, birth weight, 
and premature birth, and it discussed contraindicated pregnancies.272 The Committee 
also reviewed some data regarding the effectiveness of different contraceptive 
methods and sterilization procedures in preventing or reducing pregnancies and 
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abortion rates, and it cited the cost-effectiveness of contraception.273 The Committee 
acknowledged both risks and benefits of contraceptive methods, including minimal 
side effects and low death rates, and also noted therapeutic benefits.274 The 
Committee then referenced coverage practices in private health insurance and public 
insurance programs, discussing the impact of cost sharing on utilization.275 
In his dissenting statement, Professor Lo Sasso, a health economics and health 
policy expert, spoke specifically to the Committee’s flawed evaluation of evidence 
and the risk of the Committee making “poorly informed decisions” because of the 
unrealistic time constraints.276 He urged that the Committee recommend “no 
additional preventive services beyond those explicitly stated in the [ACA] . . . until 
such time as the evidence can be objectively and systematically evaluated and an 
appropriate framework can be developed.”277 He was especially cognizant of the 
“remarkably short time frame . . . for the task of reviewing all evidence for 
preventive services beyond the services encompassed by [other specified entities or 
projects].”278 He observed: “As the Report acknowledges, the lack of time prevented 
a serious and systematic review of evidence for preventive services.”279 The 
Committee erred, he thought, in its “zeal to recommend something despite the time 
constraints and a far from perfect methodology.”280 For Lo Sasso, it was important 
that readers of the report understand that “the recommendations were made without 
high quality, systematic evidence of the preventive nature of the services 
considered.”281 These deficiencies in the evidence evaluation process, he thought, 
were “a fatal flaw of the Report particularly in light of the importance of the 
recommendations for public policy and the number of individuals, both men and 
women, [who] will be affected.”282 
In addition to his concerns regarding the unrealistic time constraints and the 
deficient evidence evaluation process, Lo Sasso expressed concern about “the lack of 
a coherent framework to evaluate coverage apart from the evidence regarding 
clinical efficacy.”283 Thus, for Lo Sasso, the Committee blurred the lines between 
clinical recommendations and coverage decisions, failing to differentiate properly 
among the materials they reviewed in terms of scientific weight.284 
                                                          
 273 Id. at 104–09 
 274 Id. at 105–07. 
 275 Id. at 108–09. 
 276 Id. at 231. 
 277 Id.  
 278 Id. at 232. 
 279 Id. 
 280 Id. 
 281 Id. He restated this assessment in different terms: “evidence that use of the services in 
question leads to lower rates of disability or disease and increased rates of well-being is 
generally absent.” Id. 
 282 Id. at 233. 
 283 Id.  
 284 Id. 
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Law Professor Helen M. Alvaré has carefully reviewed the empirical grounds 
cited by the IOM Committee.285 Her assessment of the report and recommendation is 
deeply critical: “the IOM’s argument [that free contraception, sterilization, and 
[emergency contraceptives] are crucial for preserving women’s health] is poorly 
sourced, poorly reasoned, biased, and incomplete with respect to the questions of 
contraception and women’s health.”286 Her evaluation of the report concluded with 
the following: 
In sum, the IOM Report did not prove any of the following: that it used a reliable and 
consistent measure of unintended pregnancy; that there is a relationship between 
contraceptive usage and unintended pregnancy or abortion rates; that unintended 
pregnancy causes poor health outcomes for women; that rates of contraceptive usage 
are driven by cost; or that increasing usage among the objects of the Report—
employed women and the daughters of the employed—will affect rates of unintended 
pregnancy which are highest among women already provided with free or low-cost 
contraception from the government. The IOM Report also did not consider the several 
categories of well-developed literature bearing on the subject of the links between 
contraceptive usage and women’s health: physical side-effects of contraception; and 
the social changes effected by dissociating sex from commitment and from 
parenting.287 
Soon after the IOM Committee issued its report, HRSA simply adopted the 
Committee’s recommendations and issued its guidelines, which had the effect of 
mandating the contraceptive coverage.288 There is no indication that HRSA 
conducted any separate evaluation of benefits, harms, or utility.289 Likewise, in their 
August 2011 rulemaking, the Departments did not evaluate the benefits, the harms, 
or the utility of the contraceptive coverage mandate, and they asserted in conclusory 
terms that they did not expect the amendment to the interim final rules to result in 
any additional significant burden or costs to the affected entities.290 At the time of 
this rulemaking, the Administration’s consideration of benefits, harms, and utility 
was limited to its analysis in the July 2010 rulemaking, in which the Departments 
could not have assessed benefits, harms, or utility of the contraceptive coverage 
mandate because the guidelines had not been developed.291 Thus, as of August 2011, 
the evaluation of benefits, harms, and utility was limited to the IOM Committee’s 
deficient consideration. 
The Departments’ most direct consideration of benefits occurred in their 
February 2012 rulemaking.292 In this rulemaking, in which the Departments finalized 
                                                          
 285 Alvaré, supra note 34, at 382–83. 
 286 Id. at 382. Professor Alvaré’s critical evaluation of the IOM Committee’s report is 
comprehensive and lengthy. Id. at 391–431. This Article will not undertake to perform the 
same critical evaluation of the IOM Committee’s report that her article does so well.  
 287 Id. at 431. 
 288 See supra Part II.B.3. 
 289 See supra Part II.B.3. 
 290 Amended Interim Final Rules, supra note 43, at 46,625. See supra Part II.B.4 
(discussing the Departments’ August 2011 rulemaking). 
 291 See supra Part II.B.1. 
 292 See supra Part II.B.5 (discussing the February 2012 rulemaking). 
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their interim final rules, they cited various benefits, drawing primarily on the IOM 
Committee’s report.293 The Departments did not, however, discuss any harms, such 
as side effects or other possible adverse consequences. As for utility, the 
Departments relied upon Congress’s general policy that coverage of preventive 
services is necessary to achieve basic health care coverage.294 In the Departments’ 
view, the unique health needs of women disadvantage them in the work force, and 
access to contraception improves the socioeconomic status of women.295 
Additionally, the Departments expressed their beliefs that cost sharing can be a 
significant barrier to effective contraception and that providing women broad access 
to preventive services and contraceptive services reduces gender disparities.296 In the 
July 2013 rulemaking, the Departments conducted no analysis of benefits, harms, or 
utility of the mandate.297  
At no point in these rulemakings did the Departments engage in a careful 
analysis of the benefits and the harms or the utility of including all FDA-approved 
contraceptive methods, sterilization procedures, and patient education and 
counseling in the mandated package of preventive health services. Rather, the 
Departments relied upon the IOM Committee to conduct whatever analysis would be 
conducted as to the benefits, the harms, and the utility, but, as was discussed above, 
the Committee’s analysis itself suffers from deficiencies. Additionally, throughout 
these rulemakings and the development of the mandate, neither the Departments nor 
the IOM Committee considered the harm to human embryos that can be caused by 
some FDA-approved methods in some circumstances.298 Thus, the Administration 
failed to make an adequate case for the mandate based upon a careful analysis of the 
benefits, the harms, and the utility. 
2. The Other General Moral Considerations 
Even if the Administration could adequately show that the first three general 
moral considerations warranted its action in imposing the mandate on group health 
plans, health insurance issuers, and many employers, analysis of the other general 
moral considerations highlights additional problems with the mandate.299 
 a.  Justice 
While developing and implementing the mandate, the Administration considered 
some of the justice implications of the mandate. In the February 2012 and July 2013 
rulemakings, the Departments discussed the distribution of benefits and burdens 
among men and women (distributive justice) and highlighted gender equity as one of 
                                                          
 293 Final Rules, supra note 59, at 8727–28.  
 294 Id. at 8727. 
 295 Id. at 8728. 
 296 Id. 
 297 See supra Part II.B.9 (discussing the Departments’ July 2013 rulemaking). 
 298 For a discussion of the acknowledgments of the federal government and drug 
manufacturers of the post-fertilization harm that can be caused by some FDA-approved 
methods, see Alvaré, supra note 34, at 384 & n.21, 394–95 & nn.65–78. 
 299 Because the mandate does not appear to pose a serious privacy/confidentiality concern, 
the analysis here does not explore that consideration.  
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the principal interests they were seeking to promote by creating a positive right to 
contraceptive coverage.300 Additionally, in various rulemakings, the Departments 
identified burdens women bear in connection with pregnancies and childbearing, and 
they listed perceived benefits associated with cost-free contraception and the 
prevention of unintended pregnancies.301  
The Administration did not, however, fully consider the concerns of justice 
(including social justice) when it adopted the mandate. The fundamental principle of 
justice is to give each person his or her due,302 and what justice requires for one 
person cannot be determined without considering justice for others in society to 
whom that person relates.303 Consequently, for the Administration to address justice 
adequately as a general moral consideration, a broad analysis of what was due to 
other persons and entities was also required, and without that broad analysis, the 
Administration could not determine whether it was truly dispensing justice and 
giving to each person his or her due. A circumspect assessment of justice would also 
require evaluation of the effects the mandate would have on a wide range of 
institutions in society, including the vast numbers of religious institutions, nonprofit 
organizations, and businesses affected. The Administration’s consideration of 
distributive justice was incomplete because it failed to consider carefully the burdens 
it was placing upon the range of individuals and entities subject to the mandate. 
Furthermore, the Administration was late in considering some burdens (i.e., burdens 
on religious organizations, nonprofit organizations, and health insurers), and it failed 
to consider other burdens entirely during the rulemakings (i.e., burdens on owners of 
for-profit companies who object on religious and moral grounds to particular 
contraceptive methods).304 
As for procedural justice, the Administration decided to use procedures in 
developing and imposing the mandate that failed to ensure meaningful public 
participation, including the participation of affected parties. The Departments’ 
                                                          
 300 See supra Parts II.B.5 and II.B.9. 
 301 See supra Parts II.B.5 and II.B.9. 
 302 See EMIL BRUNNER, JUSTICE AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 23 (Mary Hottinger trans., 1945) 
(“From time immemorial the principle of justice has been defined as the suum cuique—the 
rendering to each man of his due.”). The maxim of Roman law suum cuique tribuere (give to 
each his due), which for the Roman jurist Ulpian was one of the three basic principles of right, 
expresses this understanding. 1 THE DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN 10 (Alan Watson ed., 1985). United 
States Supreme Court Justice Stanley Matthews referred to this maxim as the “fundamental 
maxim of distributive justice.” Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 531 (1884). 
 303 See Robert John Araujo, S.J., Our Debt to De Vitoria: A Catholic Foundation of Human 
Rights, 10 AVE MARIA L. REV. 313, 317–18 (2012). He wrote:  
In essence, the justice that is due someone or something relates to what is due others 
with whom this person shares society and is therefore in relationship with other 
persons. In other words, the justice for one cannot be determined until what is just—
what is proper, and what is improper—for others involved with the same question or 
issue is considered and determined. In consequence, what is due one person cannot be 
considered until what is due others who find themselves in the same context is 
considered. 
Id.  
 304 See supra Part III.A. 
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decisions to use the interim final rulemaking processes in their July 2010 and August 
2011 rulemakings and to claim exemptions from the regular notice-and-comment 
rulemaking process did not comport with procedural justice.305 Additionally, the 
Administration gave critical policymaking authority to the IOM Committee, but the 
Committee’s process failed to ensure meaningful participation by the public and 
interested persons and institutions.306 Both the Departments and the Committee could 
have chosen procedures that would have ensured broader and more meaningful 
participation, but they instead utilized processes that constricted and delayed the 
public’s participation. As a result of the Departments’ selection of rulemaking 
procedures, the mandate was in place upon HRSA’s issuance of guidelines on 
August 1, 2011, before the Departments issued their first response to any of the 
thousands of public comments submitted in response to their July 2010 interim final 
rules.307 
b.  Autonomy/Liberty 
In creating a positive right to contraceptive coverage, the Administration 
infringed the negative rights of individuals, businesses, and nonprofit and religious 
organizations under the First Amendment and RFRA.308 Additionally, by mandating 
coverage of preventive health services and all FDA-approved contraceptive methods 
and sterilization procedures, Congress and the Administration intruded upon the 
autonomous choices and actions of individuals, businesses, nonprofit organizations, 
and religious institutions.309 The Departments did not fully consider these 
                                                          
 305 See supra Parts II.B.1 and II.B.4–5. 
 306 In six months, the Committee met five times and conducted three open sessions. See 
supra Part II.B.2. Professor Alvaré has provided the following observation regarding the 
stacking of committee membership and invited witnesses, which limited the participation of 
affected persons:  
At least nine of the sixteen panel members had close ties with the nation’s largest 
provider of government-subsidized birth control, and the largest abortion provider, 
Planned Parenthood—serving as members or even chairs of boards of directors of 
various Planned Parenthood affiliates nationwide. They had recently donated over one 
hundred thousand dollars to that organization. Others founded or worked directly for 
other contraception and abortion advocacy groups. Invited witnesses included Planned 
Parenthood, the abortion advocacy groups the National Women’s Law Center, and the 
Guttmacher Institute. There was no representative on the panel, or as a witness, from 
the leading private provider of health care to women in the United States: Catholic 
health care services. 
Alvaré, supra note 34, at 430–31. In addition to Catholic health care services, no 
representative of other groups such as Americans United for Life, Concerned Women for 
America, Family Research Council, and Physicians for Life was included on the panel or 
invited to present at a committee meeting. 
 307 See supra Parts II.B.3–5. 
 308 See supra Part III (discussing the burden imposed on religious freedom).  
 309 Professor Gostin has explained that “[a]utonomy, literally ‘self-governance,’ has 
acquired meanings as diverse as liberty, privacy, individual choice, and even economic 
freedom. . . . Autonomous persons are free to hold views, make choices, and take actions 
based on personal values.” GOSTIN, supra note 219, at 48. Gostin has recognized that 
government through regulation and public health activities interferes with the liberty and 
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infringements in their rulemaking, and what consideration they did give these 
infringements was years late. 
c. Integrity 
Reproductive rights, birth control, abortion, and women’s freedom have been key 
pieces of President Obama’s political activities, campaign promises, and policy 
agenda.310 However, in November 2011, after the Departments’ first two 
rulemakings, the IOM Committee’s release of its recommendations, and HRSA’s 
issuance of its guidelines, President Obama called Archbishop Dolan, the USCCB 
president, and invited him to meet to discuss issues related to the coverage of 
preventive services.311 In his account of their 45-minute discussion, Dolan explained 
that, at the conclusion of the meeting, he summarized the substance of the 
President’s understanding as it had been conveyed to him: 
I said, “I’ve heard you say, first of all, that you have immense regard for 
the work of the Catholic Church in the United States in health care, 
education and charity.   . . . I have heard you say that you are not going to 
let the administration do anything to impede that work and . . . that you 
take the protection of the rights of conscience with the utmost seriousness. 
. . . Does that accurately sum up our conversation?” [Mr. Obama] said, 
“You bet it does.”312 
                                                          
autonomy of individuals and businesses to act in their own interests, constrains the rights of 
individuals and businesses, and controls individuals and businesses “for the aggregate good.” 
Id. at 10–11.  
 310 Alvaré, supra note 34, at 386–87. In her article on the mandate, Professor Alvaré 
chronicled some of the President’s political associations and activities. Id. She wrote: 
During his campaign, President Obama also associated himself frequently with the 
self-branded champion of women, and the premier promoter of a linkage between 
birth control, abortion, and women’s freedom: the Planned Parenthood Federation of 
America. Planned Parenthood donated 15 million dollars of campaign advertisements 
to the President’s re-election campaign. And the President continued strenuously to 
support both federal and state grants for Planned Parenthood, for hundreds of millions 
dollars annually, as well as to deploy his Administration’s Department of Justice to 
states where legislatures had re-directed their family planning funds away from local 
Planned Parenthoods, in favor of providers without an abortion connection. The 
Department of Justice threatened these states with the withdrawal of all federal 
Medicaid funding for all services for the poor. Very likely, President Obama’s close 
association with Planned Parenthood strengthened his campaign’s and his 
Administration’s publicity regarding their support for women. It also raised questions 
about the objectivity of the Mandate and the Report supporting it—both of which 
were mirror images of Planned Parenthood’s agenda, and that of its former research 
affiliate, the Guttmacher Institute, respecting contraception and religious objectors. 
Id. at 387. See supra note 28 (discussing the links between the Administration, abortion 
providers, and the manufacturer of Plan B). 
 311 See supra Part II.B.5 (discussing the meeting between President Obama and Archbishop 
Dolan). 
 312 Taranto, supra note 63. 
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President Obama gave Dolan permission to share that message with the other 
bishops.313  
Two months later, in January 2012, President Obama called Archbishop Dolan 
“to say that the mandates remain in place and that there would be no substantive 
change, and that the only thing he could offer [the archbishop] was that [the Catholic 
Church and its institutions] would have until August.”314 In his account of this call, 
Dolan explained: 
I said, “Mr. President, I appreciate the call. Are you saying now that we 
have until August to introduce to you continual concerns that might 
trigger a substantive mitigation in these mandates?” He said, “No, the 
mandates remain. We’re more or less giving you this time to find out how 
you’re going to be able to comply.” I said, “Well, sir, we don’t need the 
[extra time]. I can tell you now we’re unable to comply.”315 
A few weeks later, in the wake of a strong public response to the 
Administration’s hard-lined approach, President Obama called Archbishop Dolan to 
indicate that the Administration was developing a plan to shift the cost of paying for 
the mandated coverage to insurers.316  
In February 2012, the Departments finalized the interim final rules, adopting 
them without any substantive change.317 At the same time, the Administration 
announced the one-year enforcement safe harbor for non-exempt, nonprofit religious 
organizations with religious objections and its plan to develop narrowly defined 
accommodations.318 
d. Transparency 
The Departments’ decision to adopt the mandate through interim final 
rulemakings in July 2010 and August 2011, and their reliance on exemptions from 
the standard notice-and-comment rulemaking process, thwarted transparency in the 
adoption of the mandate.319 Additionally, the Administration decided to use a 
sympathetic IOM Committee to provide a favorable sifting of evidence and to put a 
medical- and social-scientific veneer on the Administration’s political and policy 
commitments.320 Consequently, the IOM Committee recommendation process 
afforded the Administration a forum to ensure the success of its desired policy 
outcomes, while giving the appearance of openness, scientific grounding, and 
                                                          
 313 Id. 
 314 Id. 
 315 Id. 
 316 Id. Archbishop Dolan was elevated to cardinal on February 18, 2012, which was after 
his meeting and conversations with the President but before this account was published in The 
Wall Street Journal. Id.  
 317 See supra Part II.B.5. 
 318 See supra Part II.B.5. 
 319 See supra Parts II.B.1 and II.B.4. 
 320 See supra Part II.B.2. 
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meaningful deliberation and obtaining the political and legal advantages that come 
from the endorsement of an “independent expert” panel.321 
The Committee itself did not ensure transparency and information disclosure in 
its work, and the Committee’s membership and invited witnesses failed to represent 
the broader array of public views on the issues.322 In his dissenting opinion, 
Professor Lo Sasso observed:  
[T]he committee process for evaluation of the evidence lacked 
transparency and was largely subject to the preferences of the 
committee’s composition. Troublingly, the process tended to result in a 
mix of objective and subjective determinations filtered through a lens of 
advocacy. An abiding principle in the evaluation of the evidence and the 
recommendations put forth as a consequence should be transparency and 
strict objectivity, but the committee failed to demonstrate these principles 
in the Report.323 
e.  Trust 
The procedures used by the Administration and the substantive policy developed 
did not build and maintain public trust. Rather, the Administration’s infringements 
of religious freedom and conscience, the way in which it went about developing and 
imposing the mandate, its delay in exempting religious employers and 
accommodating non-exempt, nonprofit religious organizations with religious 
objections, and the narrowness of the religious-employer exemption and 
accommodations likely contributed to some of the decline President Obama has 
experienced in trustworthiness.324 
                                                          
 321 See U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs, News Release, Affordable Care Act 
Ensures Women Receive Preventive Services at No Additional Cost (Aug. 1, 2011), 
http://wayback.archive-it.org/3926/20140108162111/http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2011 
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3. The Justificatory Conditions 
Analysis of the mandate under the general moral considerations shows both the 
Administration’s failure to demonstrate that the mandate was warranted based upon 
the benefits, the harms, and the utility, and the conflict that exists between the 
benefits, the harm prevention, and the utility claimed by the Administration and the 
other general moral considerations proposed by Childress and his colleagues.325 
Consequently, under the framework of Childress and his colleagues, further analysis 
is required based on the justificatory conditions, and the Administration, as the 
proponent of the public health initiative, would bear the burden of justifying the 
mandate.  
a. Effectiveness 
In their rulemakings, the Departments did not demonstrate the mandate’s 
effectiveness. In the July 2010 rulemaking, for instance, the Departments discussed 
the new coverage requirements in the ACA, the ACA’s and the Administration’s 
general policy favoring utilization of preventive services, factors that contributed to 
underutilization of preventive services, and benefits expected to result from the 
coverage mandates.326 In this rulemaking, however, the Departments did not 
specifically show that the contraceptive coverage mandate would protect public 
health or that the mandate would realize the Departments’ goals, which they did not 
articulate until their February 2012 rulemaking.327 Likewise, in the August 2011 
rulemaking, the Departments did not make any such effectiveness showing.328 
In its report, the IOM Committee discussed the effectiveness and cost-
effectiveness of contraceptive methods, sterilization procedures, and patient 
education and counseling in preventing pregnancies.329 Although the Committee 
noted coverage practices in private and public health insurance and some existing 
coverage recommendations, the Committee did not show that the clinical 
effectiveness of methods and procedures would result in the achievement of the 
Administration’s public health and gender equity goals or that the mandated 
coverage would achieve the Administration’s identified goals.330 The closest the 
Committee came to this type of effectiveness assessment is found in the following 
statements: 
                                                          
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/11/25/obama-poll_n_4337643.html. In a November 
2013 poll, which was released just four months after the Administration issued the final rules 
on the mandate, the religious-employer exemption, and the accommodations, 53 percent of 
those polled indicated that the President was not honest or trustworthy, which “mark[ed] the 
first time that the CNN/ORC polling found a clear majority questioning the president’s 
integrity.” Id. 
 325 See supra Parts IV.C.1–2. 
 326 See supra Part II.B.1; Interim Final Rules, supra note 19, at 41,730–38.  
 327 See supra Part II.B.5; Final Rules, supra note 59, at 8,728–29.  
 328 See supra Part II.B.4; Amended Interim Final Rules, supra note 43, at 46,621.  
 329 See CLOSING THE GAPS REPORT, supra note 31, at 104–09. 
 330 Id. at 108–09. 
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It is thought that greater use of long-acting, reversible contraceptive 
methods—including intrauterine devices and contraceptive implants that 
require less action by the woman and therefore have lower use failure 
rates—might help further reduce unintended pregnancy rates . . . The 
elimination of cost sharing for contraception therefore could greatly 
increase its use, including use of the more effective and longer-acting 
methods, especially among poor and low-income women most at risk for 
unintended pregnancy.331 
In his dissenting statement, Professor Lo Sasso identified a fundamental flaw in 
the Committee’s effectiveness assessment – the Committee “lack[ed] . . . a coherent 
framework to evaluate coverage apart from the evidence regarding clinical 
efficacy.”332 The Committee’s inability to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
contraceptive coverage mandate may stem from this methodological deficiency, as 
well as the fact that the Committee had “barely six months from the time the group 
was empanelled” to review all evidence of preventive services and issue the final 
report.333 
Accordingly, the Administration did not make the necessary showing that the 
mandate was likely to protect public health and achieve gender equity. This failure 
undercuts its justification for infringing one or more general moral considerations.  
b. Proportionality 
In the July 2010 and August 2011 rulemakings, the Departments did not show 
that the probable public health benefits outweighed the infringed general moral 
considerations (such as breached autonomy/liberty).334 Indeed, these rulemakings do 
not reveal much of any willingness on the part of the Departments to acknowledge 
that the mandate caused any infringement. However, in the August 2011 rulemaking, 
the Departments acknowledged that an exception was warranted for a very narrow 
class of religious employers, and they expressed their view that this narrow 
definition “reasonably balance[d]” their goal of extending coverage broadly with 
“respecting the unique relationship between certain religious employers and their 
employees in certain religious positions.”335 Implicit in the Departments’ discussion 
was an assumption that the benefits outweigh any other infringement, and thus the 
Departments did not assign relative weights or weigh perceived benefits against any 
other infringement.  
In the February 2012 rulemaking, the Departments gave more attention to the 
claimed benefits of the mandate and to possible infringements.336 In this rulemaking, 
the Departments addressed, for the first time, conscience protections in federal laws, 
the religious beliefs of organizations and individuals other than those in their 
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narrowly defined class of religious employers, the First Amendment, and RFRA.337 
The Departments’ announcement of the one-year enforcement safe harbor and their 
plan to develop accommodations for non-exempt, nonprofit religious organizations 
with religious objections may constitute something of a concession regarding 
possible infringements.338 But, in any event, they deemed their interests compelling 
and concluded that their approach was consistent with the First Amendment and 
RFRA.339 Consequently, the Departments failed to provide a careful assessment of 
proportionality between the claimed benefits and the infringements. Instead, the 
Departments manifested a commitment to retain the mandate, which was already in 
effect, and a willingness to make only minor adjustments for narrowly defined 
classes of religious employers and non-exempt, nonprofit religious organizations 
with religious objections.340 
In the July 2013 rulemaking, the Departments gave more attention to the First 
Amendment and RFRA issues, but their assessment extended only to questions 
related to religious employers and non-exempt, nonprofit religious organizations 
with religious objections.341 In the regulatory materials, they expressed their view 
that the accommodations did not violate RFRA and that the religious-employer 
exemption and the accommodations did not violate the First Amendment.342 
The various rules adopted by the Departments and the accompanying regulatory 
materials do not evidence a fulsome balancing of all positive features and benefits 
against the negative features and consequences. To the extent that a proportionality 
assessment was performed, it was late, and it was restricted to a narrow class of 
religious employers and narrowly-defined accommodations of non-exempt, 
nonprofit religious organizations with religious objections. At no time did the 
Departments perform a proportionality assessment as to for-profit organizations. 
Accordingly, proponents of the mandate failed to make the requisite showing that the 
probable public health benefits outweighed infringed general moral considerations. 
c. Necessity and Least Infringement 
In their rulemakings, the Departments failed to show that the required coverage 
of all FDA-approved contraceptive methods, sterilization procedures, patient 
education and counseling was necessary to realize the Administration’s public health 
and gender equity goals, and they were late in addressing whether less infringing or 
less restrictive alternatives were available.343 Judging from the rulemakings and 
regulatory materials, it does not appear that the Department sensed an obligation to 
address questions of necessity and less infringing alternatives as to contraceptive 
                                                          
 337 See supra Part II.B.5. 
 338 It may simply reflect election year politics, as 2012 was a presidential election year. See 
supra note 139. 
 339 See supra Parts II.B.5 and III.A. 
 340 See supra Parts II.B.5, II.B.7, II.B.8, and II.B.9. 
 341 See supra Parts II.B.9 and III.A. 
 342 See supra Parts II.B.9 and III.A. 
 343 Childress and his colleagues indicated that the justificatory condition of least 
infringement may be understood as a corollary of the justificatory condition of necessity. 
Childress et al., supra note 241, at 172. They will be so treated here.  
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coverage, perhaps in part because the ACA mandated coverage of preventive health 
services. The issues should not, however, be conflated because Congress did not 
require that all FDA-approved contraceptive methods and sterilization procedures be 
included within the package of covered preventive health services.344 
In the July 2010 rulemaking, the Departments discussed the ACA coverage 
requirements, the ACA’s and the Administration’s general policy favoring utilization 
of preventive services, factors that contributed to underutilization of preventive 
services, and benefits expected to result from the coverage mandates generally.345 
The Departments referenced the need to address market failures that lead to 
underutilization of preventive services and barriers that result from cost sharing.346 
The Departments also asserted that their rules were necessary because plan sponsors 
and issuers needed to know how to provide the coverage without cost sharing.347 In 
conclusory terms, the Departments asserted that their rules regarding coverage of 
preventive services were “designed to be the least burdensome alternative.”348 
Neither the IOM Committee nor HRSA assessed whether the contraceptive 
coverage mandate was necessary to realize the Administration’s goals. Indeed, one 
of the criticisms highlighted by Professor Lo Sasso in his dissenting opinion was the 
Committee’s failure to show that the services will accomplish the desired goals, let 
alone that the coverage mandate was necessary to realize the Administration’s public 
health and gender equity goals: “[T]he [Committee’s] recommendations were made 
without high quality, systematic evidence of the preventive nature of the services 
considered. Put differently, evidence that use of the services in question leads to 
lower rates of disability or disease and increased rates of well-being is generally 
absent.”349 Additionally, neither the IOM Committee nor HRSA evaluated 
alternative means of realizing the goals.  
Likewise, in their August 3, 2011 rulemaking, the Departments did not closely 
scrutinize the necessity of the contraceptive coverage mandate to realize the 
Administration’s public health goals or evaluate alternative means of realizing the 
public health goals apart from the mandate.350 As the “need” for regulatory action in 
this rulemaking, the Departments cited their assessment that an amendment to the 
interim final rule was warranted to provide HRSA discretion to exempt certain 
religious employers.351 
                                                          
 344 See supra Part II.A. 
 345 See supra Parts IV.C.1 and IV.C.3.a. 
 346 Interim Final Rules, supra note 19, at 41,731. 
 347 Id. 
 348 Id. at 41,739. By choosing to use the interim final rulemaking process, the Departments 
sidestepped some of the analyses that would be required under federal law, such as analyses 
under the Regulatory Flexibility Act and the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act. The 
Departments did provide a conclusory assessment that their rules were “consistent with the 
policy embodied in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act.” Id. 
 349 CLOSING THE GAPS REPORT, supra note 31, at 232. 
 350 See supra Part II.B.4. 
 351 Amended Interim Final Rules, supra note 43, at 46,625. 
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With the February 2012 rulemaking, the Departments, in response to the high 
volume of comments that had been submitted, began to think about some 
alternatives as they considered accommodations for non-exempt, nonprofit religious 
organizations with religious objections.352 Although the Departments’ development 
of accommodations does represent an effort to minimize some infringement caused 
by the mandate, the accommodations had a narrow scope, and the accommodations 
did not extend beyond the narrow class of organizations identified by the 
Departments.353 
In the July 2013 rulemaking, the Departments finalized the rules regarding the 
religious-employer exemption and the accommodations, and they directly addressed 
alternatives to the mandate.354 Commenters on the Departments’ February 2013 
proposed rules had suggested various alternatives to the mandated contraceptive 
coverage: the government could provide contraceptive services to all women free of 
charge; the government could establish a government-funded health benefits 
program for contraceptive services; the government could require drug and device 
manufacturers to provide contraceptive drugs and devices free of charge; and the 
government could require multi-state plans on the exchanges to offer a stand-alone, 
contraceptive-only benefit to all women without charge.355  
The Departments offered several responses. First, the suggested alternatives 
“were not feasible and/or would not advance the government’s compelling interests 
as effectively as the mechanisms established” in the final rules and the preventive 
health services coverage regulations generally.356 Second, the Departments lacked 
the statutory authority and funding to implement the proposed alternatives.357 Third, 
the ACA contemplates that the existing employer-based system of health insurance 
would provide coverage of recommended preventive services so that “women face 
minimal logistical and administrative obstacles.”358 Fourth, imposing additional 
requirements on women receiving the intended coverage “would make that coverage 
accessible to fewer women.”359 Although these responses addressed alternatives 
proposed by commenters, the responses were conclusory, and the Departments did 
not otherwise attempt to find a less infringing or less restrictive alternative. 
Because of the Administration’s failure to address carefully questions of 
necessity and less infringing alternatives, the mandate was challenged in dozens of 
cases throughout the nation.360 As discussed earlier, the Supreme Court eventually 
determined that the Administration failed to show that the mandate was the least 
                                                          
 352 See supra Part II.B.5. 
 353 In response to the Supreme Court’s ruling in the Hobby Lobby Stores case, the 
Administration has proposed new rules that will expand the class of organizations that qualify 
for an accommodation. See supra Part II.C and III.D. 
 354 See supra Part II.B.9 and III.A. 
 355 See July 2013 Final Rules, supra note 17, at 39,888. 
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 357 Id. 
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 360 See supra Parts I and III. 
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restrictive means of furthering the claimed interests.361 According to the Court, the 
Administration had “not shown that it lacks other means of achieving its desired goal 
without imposing a substantial burden on the exercise of religion by the objecting 
parties in these cases.”362 The Court added: 
The most straightforward way of doing this would be for the Government 
to assume the cost of providing the four contraceptives at issue to any 
women who are unable to obtain them under their health-insurance 
policies due to their employers’ religious objections. This would certainly 
be less restrictive of the plaintiffs’ religious liberty, and [the 
Administration] has not shown that this is not a viable alternative.363 
Under the framework proposed by Childress and his colleagues, the 
Administration failed to justify the mandate by showing both that it was necessary to 
realize the public health goals and that it was the least infringing or the least 
restrictive option among alternatives. These were showings that the Administration 
was required to make as the proponent of this public health policy, especially given 
the coercive nature of the mandate. 
d. Public Justification 
The Departments chose to use the interim final rulemaking process (and not the 
standard notice-and-comment rulemaking process in its first two rulemakings) and to 
make use of an IOM Committee partially composed of representatives of pro-choice 
advocacy groups that had a short timeframe in which to generate a report and 
recommendations.364 By making these choices, the Departments accelerated the 
rulemaking process, but they also suppressed public participation. By sidestepping 
the standard notice-and-rulemaking process, the Departments missed important 
opportunities both to gain the benefit of feedback from the public and interested 
persons and to provide a public justification for the mandate. Although the 
Departments’ manipulation of the rulemaking process ensured their success in 
putting the mandate in place upon HRSA’s adoption of the IOM Committee’s 
hurriedly-prepared report and recommendations and HRSA’s issuance of its 
guidelines, the process they selected gave the public limited opportunity for input 
and required the Departments to provide only limited justification for their mandate.  
Such manipulation of process runs directly counter to the understanding of 
Childress and his colleagues regarding public justification and public accountability 
in public health activities.365 Under their framework, the federal government was to 
ensure a public process that included proposals, justifications, deliberation, feedback, 
reconsideration, and a final decision.366 Additionally, Childress and his colleagues 
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 362 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2780 (2014).  
 363 Id. (internal citation omitted). 
 364 See supra Parts II.B.1–4. 
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understood to include public justification, “involves soliciting input from the relevant publics 
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wrote: “the public, along with scientific experts, plays an important role in the 
analysis of public health issues, as well as in the development and assessment of 
appropriate strategies for addressing them.”367  
In the case of the mandate, the Departments restricted the public’s participation 
both in the analysis of the issues and in the development and assessment of 
appropriate strategies. The Administration also failed to explain and justify the 
infringement of one or more general moral considerations. To the extent that the 
Administration provided justification to the public and to the individuals, religious 
institutions, nonprofit organizations, and businesses burdened by the mandate for its 
infringement of one or more general moral considerations, the justification was late 
and lacking. Thus, with public justification, as with the other justificatory conditions, 
the Administration failed to make the requisite showing.  
D.  The Administration’s Failure of Deliberation and Justification in This Public 
Health Initiative 
An application of the framework proposed by Childress and his colleagues 
suggests significant deficiencies in the Administration’s deliberation regarding, and 
justification of, the mandate. The Departments failed to evaluate various general 
moral considerations, recognize the conflicts among considerations caused by the 
mandate, and provide an adequate public justification of their public health initiative 
and their infringement of important values. In the final analysis, this public health 
initiative began poorly with the Departments’ decision to proceed by interim final 
rulemaking—not just once, but twice—and public and transparent deliberation about 
and justifications for the mandate have been very slow in coming. This is hardly 
what Childress and his colleagues contemplated in their framework for carefully 
evaluating public health policies, practices, and activities and resolving conflicts 
among moral considerations. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
This Article has analyzed the contraceptive coverage mandate from three 
perspectives. It explored the rulemaking processes used by executive departments of 
the federal government in developing the mandate, including their use of an IOM 
Committee to develop recommendations. This analysis highlighted the Obama 
Administration’s decisions to bypass standard regulatory procedures and instead to 
use the interim final rulemaking process, which restricted public participation in the 
development of the rules and hampered transparency and deliberation in the 
rulemaking process. This Article also analyzed the mandate under the framework 
that Congress mandated in RFRA. This analysis showed that the Departments 
overlooked this legal standard in its first several rulemakings and failed to consider 
carefully the burden their mandate placed on the negative right of religious freedom. 
Finally, this Article analyzed the mandate under the public health policy and ethics 
                                                          
(the numerical, political, and communal publics) in the process of formulating public health 
policies, practices, and actions, as well as justifying to the relevant publics what is being 
undertaken.” Id. at 173. Additionally, “[a]t a minimum, public accountability involves 
transparency in openly seeking information from those affected and in honestly disclosing 
relevant information to the public; it is indispensable for engendering and sustaining public 
trust, as well as for expressing justice.” Id.  
 367 Id. at 174 (emphases in original). 
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framework proposed by Professor Childress and his colleagues. This analysis 
showed that the Administration’s deliberation failed to address adequately several 
general moral considerations and conflicts among considerations and failed to justify 
the mandate’s infringements. 
In addition to providing these three analyses, this study has also provided insight 
regarding the moral decision-making inherent in policymaking and lawmaking and 
in the public health enterprise. The mandate is a piece of progressive “legislation.”368 
It was not enacted by the duly-elected representatives of the American people. 
Rather, the mandate was made through the sorts of administrative rulemaking 
processes that progressives have preferred for the better part of a century: 
“administratively organized ‘communities’ of highly trained, objective 
professionals” with quasi-legislative powers making rules based upon “unbiased” 
physical and social sciences, technical expertise, and empirical data with the goal of 
leading society forward and bringing about transformative social, legal, and 
economic reforms.369 The mandate (and the Administration’s arguments defending 
against challenges to the mandate) also exhibited the longstanding opposition of 
progressives to the interests of businesses and business owners who are viewed as 
obstacles to social progress.370 
This progressive approach to policymaking and lawmaking obscures some of the 
moral decision-making inherent in such regulatory activity, but the analytical 
framework of Childress and his colleagues helps to reveal more fully the moral 
decision-making that is in fact involved. As discussed above, public health activities 
are often understood to have a teleological or consequentialist orientation.371 And, in 
the framework proposed by Childress and his colleagues, consequentialism is 
evident in their first three general moral considerations: producing benefits, 
preventing harms, and maximizing utility (i.e., the balance of benefits over costs).372 
Professor Gostin agrees that moral decision-making lies at the heart of public health 
policymaking: 
Since a principal aim of public health is to achieve the greatest health benefits for 
the greatest number of people, it draws from the traditions of consequentialism, 
which judges the rightness of an action by the consequences, effects, or outcomes 
that it produces. Utilitarianism, one of the most influential forms of consequentialist 
ethical theory, holds that actions are justified insofar as they promote the greatest 
happiness of the greatest number of people.373 
                                                          
 368 Although the mandate is not technically legislation passed by a legislative body, in 
administrative law parlance the rules that promulgated the mandate are legislative rules. See 
Am. Tort Reform Ass’n v. Occupational Safety & Health Admin., 738 F.3d 387, 395 (D.C. 
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or policy.”) (quotation marks and citations omitted). 
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Although the mandate is encased in regulatory, social scientific, medical, and 
public health terminology, the analytical framework proposed by Childress and his 
colleagues helps to show that the regulations and the mandate itself are predicated 
upon moral judgments and reflect a moral vision. The moral underpinnings of the 
mandate become apparent when the Administration’s utilitarian calculus is isolated: 
the interests in public health and gender equity are compelling and outweigh the less 
weighty interests that individuals, institutions, and organizations coerced by the 
mandate might have in religious liberty, conscience, and economic freedom. True to 
its public health goals, the Administration in its mandate favored a population over 
individuals. 
For the Administration, the perceived benefits outweighed the costs. In the 
rulemakings and accompanying regulatory materials, the Administration lauded the 
anticipated benefits of readily-accessible preventive services, including a healthier 
population, disease prevention, earlier treatment, and reduced health care costs. 
Drawing on the IOM Committee’s report, it cited various possible benefits: meeting 
the basic health care needs of women; preventing unintended pregnancies (whether 
unwanted or mistimed); promoting healthy birth spacing; avoiding contraindicated 
pregnancies; saving employers pregnancy-related costs and costs related to absences 
and reduced productivity; removing the out-of-pocket-expense barrier to effective 
contraception; helping women achieve equal standing in the workforce; and 
improving the socio-economic status of women. The Administration retained a 
narrow religious-employer exemption because it believed a broader exemption 
would lead to more employees paying out of pocket for contraceptive services, 
which would make it less likely that employees would have access to and use 
contraceptives.  
The Administration deemed the costs to be minor. It asserted that the mandate 
does not undermine religious and conscience exemptions in federal law and that the 
rules are consistent with the First Amendment and RFRA. In the February 2012 
rulemaking, the Administration’s utility balancers asserted in conclusory terms that 
its “approach complies with [RFRA], which generally requires a federal law to not 
substantially burden religious exercise, or, if it does substantially burden religious 
exercise, to be the least restrictive means to further a compelling government 
interest.”374 Thus, even RFRA’s strict scrutiny standard posed no problem for the 
mandate because the Administration viewed the claimed interests as compelling. In 
the end, forcing individuals and organizations to violate the religious beliefs or 
conscience did not have much weight for the Administration’s utility balancers. 
On its face, utilitarian balancing (such as was used by the Administration in 
adopting the mandate) appears objective and capable of leading to indisputable 
conclusions. But, in reality, such moral reasoning leads to preordained conclusions 
that conform to the values of decision-makers. In other words, utilitarian balancing 
affords policymakers an opportunity to put their own thumbs on the scale as they 
import their own values and assign their values more weight and opposing values 
less weight. It appears that this is precisely what happened in the development of the 
mandate. 
Furthermore, this mode of moral decision-making emphasizes immediate and 
concrete interests, while deemphasizing or ignoring more remote, more abstract, or 
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less convenient interests.375 In the case of the mandate, the Administration’s analysis 
gave no weight to the status of the unborn, even though several FDA-approved 
contraception methods prevent fertilized eggs (human embryos) from implanting in 
the uterus. The moral concerns of Americans who understand these methods to 
constitute abortion, and not contraception, were given little or no weight by the 
Administration.376 
For the Administration and present-day progressives, health care reform has been 
a moral undertaking,377 and the contraceptive coverage mandate is an integral part of 
their larger moral endeavor. The mandate is predicated upon the Administration’s 
moral judgments, and once we acknowledge that the Administration in promulgating 
the mandate legislated morality, we can more clearly identify the contours of the 
Administration’s moral vision—its vision of the good and the just society—that 
                                                          
 375 Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. offered a similar assessment in his criticism of the 
Supreme Court’s use of a balancing test to determine whether Congress violated Article III of 
the Constitution by delegating power to an agency to adjudicate some common-law claims. 
Justice Brennan stated:  
[Balancing] pits an interest the benefits of which are immediate, concrete, and easily 
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of the Administration’s contraceptive coverage mandate. See CNN Poll: Half Oppose Obama 
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 377 See supra notes 11 and 12. 
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inspired the development of and is embedded within the mandate. The mandate is 
meant to change economic and social structures, and it advances the 
Administration’s vision of social justice. It also advances the Administration’s vision 
of women’s freedom and gender equity by requiring businesses, institutions, and 
individuals to fund the provision of broad and free access to FDA-approved 
contraceptive, sterilization, and family planning services. Additionally, the mandate 
is premised upon the moral values of the policymakers regarding the family, human 
sexuality, and the status of the unborn. Furthermore, the mandate expresses the 
Administration’s moral judgment that its vision of public health and gender equity 
should be advanced even at the expense of religious freedom, matters of conscience, 
and the economic freedom of individuals and organizations.  
Professor Gostin has warned, however, that the legitimacy of the public health 
enterprise is threatened when the enterprise becomes captive to ideology and 
political advocacy.378 He wrote: “By espousing controversial issues of economic 
redistribution and social restructuring, the field risks losing its legitimacy. Public 
health gains credibility from its adherence to science, and if it strays too far into 
political advocacy, it may lose the appearance of objectivity.”379 It may be that the 
Administration’s mandate (along with its failures in reasoned deliberation, fair and 
transparent process, and respect for autonomy and liberty, and its failures to maintain 
public trust and provide public justification) will become a prime example of a 
public health initiative delegitimized by the actions of its proponents. 
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